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Impressions of SOVIET RUSSIA and the revolutionary world

Impressions of

Soviet Russia

and the revolutionary world Mexico — China — Turkey

> by JOHN DEWEY



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PUBLISHER'S NOTE


Although changes have taken place, especially in China, since the articles contained in this book were first printed, it has been judged proper to let them stand as originally written. The four sections: Russia, Mexico, Turkey and China are arranged in the receding order of time and each is dated. Brought together and published in this manner they form a broad survey of the past revolutionary decade. All of the articles have appeared in *The New Republic*.

The illustrations are reproduced from Russian school books in the collection of Miss Ernestine Evans.

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SOVIET RUSSIA, 1928



I

LENINGRAD GIVES THE CLUE

THE alteration of Petrograd into Leningrad is without question a symbol, but the mind wavers in deciding of what. At times, it seems to mark a consummation, a kind of completed transmigration of souls. Upon other occasions, one can imagine it a species of mordant irony. For one can picture an enemy of the present

régime finding malicious satisfaction in the baptism of this shabby, down-at-heels city with the name of Lenin; its decadent, almost decaying, quality would strike him as sufficient commentary on the Bolshevik claim of having ushered in a new and better world. But one also understands that more than the name of Peter was stamped upon the city which his energetic will evoked. Everything in it speaks of his creative restlessness. Perhaps Peter, the Tsar, was, after all, what he is often called, the First of the Bolsheviki, and Lenin is his true successor and heir.

At all events, in spite of the unkempt town, whose stuccoed walls, with their peeling paint, are a splendid dress in rags, one has the impression of movement, vitality, energy. The people go about as if some mighty and oppressive load had been removed, as if they were newly awakened to the consciousness of released

energies. I am told that when Anatole France visited Russia he refused to collect statistics, accumulate data, investigate "conditions." He walked the streets to derive his ideas from the gestures and the faces of the folk. Never having been in the country before, I have no standard of comparison with what was immediately seen. Nevertheless, one has seen the common people of other countries, and I find it impossible to believe that the communicated sense of a new life was an illusion. I am willing to believe what I have read, that there is a multitude of men and women in Russia who live in immured and depressed misery, just as there is a multitude in exile. But this other multitude that walks the streets, gathers in parks, clubs, theaters, frequents museums, is also a reality, as is their unbowed, unapologetic mien. The idea forces itself upon one that perhaps the first reality is of the past, an incident of a revolution, and the second reality is of the present and future, the essence of the Revolution in its release of courage, energy and confidence in life.

My mind was in a whirl of new impressions in those early days in Leningrad. Readjustment was difficult, and I lived somewhat dazed. But gradually there emerged one definite impression that has stayed with me and has been confirmed by subsequent experiences. I have heard altogether too much about Communism, about the Third International, and altogether too little about the Revolution; too much about the Bolsheviki, even though the final revolution was accomplished by their initiation. I now realize that any student of history ought to be aware that the forces released by revolution are not functions, in any mathematical sense, of the efforts, much less the opinions and hopes, of those who set the train of events in motion. In irritation at not having applied this obvious

LENINGRAD GIVES THE CLUE

historic truth to an understanding of what is taking place in Russia, I would have shifted the blame of my misapprehension to others— I felt resentment at those adherents and eulogists as well as critics and enemies who, I felt, had misled me with constant talk and writing about Bolshevism and Communism, leaving me ignorant of the more basic fact of a revolution —one which may be hinted at, but not described, by calling it psychic and moral rather than merely political and economic, a revolution in the attitude of people toward the needs and possibilities of life. In this reaction I am perhaps inclined to underestimate the importance of the theories and expectations which operated to pull the trigger that released suppressed energies. I am still at a loss in trying to formulate the exact importance of the communistic formulæ and the Bolshevist ideals in the present life of the country; but I am inclined to think that not only the present state of Communism (that of non-existence in any literal sense), but even its future is of less account than is the fact of this achieved revolution of heart and mind, this liberation of a people to consciousness of themselves as a determining power in the shaping of their ultimate fate.

Such a conclusion may seem absurd. It will certainly be as offensive to those to whom Marxian orthodoxy constitutes the whole significance of the Russian Revolution as to those who have imbibed the conventional notion of Bolshevist Russia. Yet with no desire to minimize the import of the fate of Bolshevist Marxianism for Russia and for the whole world, my conviction is unshaken that this phase of affairs is secondary in importance to something else that can only be termed a revolution. That the existing state of affairs is not Communism but a transition to it; that in the

dialectic of history the function of Bolshevism is to annul itself; that the dictatorship of the proletariat is but an aspect of class-war, the antithesis to the thesis of the dictatorship of bourgeois capitalism existing in other countries; that it is destined to disappear in a new synthesis, are things the Communists themselves tell us. The present state is one of transition; that fact is so obvious that one has no difficulty in accepting it. That it is necessarily a state of transition to the exact goal prescribed by the Marxian philosophy of history is a tenet that, in face of the new energies that have been aroused, smells of outworn absolutistic metaphysics and bygone theories of straight-line, one-way "evolution."

But there is one impression more vivid than this one. It is, of course, conceivable that Communism in some form may be the issue of the present "transition," slight as are the evidences of its present existence. But the feeling is forced upon one that, if it does finally emerge, it will not be because of the elaborate and now stereotyped formulæ of Marxian philosophy, but because something of that sort is congenial to a people that a revolution has awakened to themselves, and that it will emerge in a form dictated by their own desires. If it fails, it will fail because energies the Revolution has aroused are too spontaneous to accommodate themselves to formulæ framed on the basis of conditions that are irrelevant except on the supposition of a single and necessary "law" of historical change.

In any case, Communism, if one judges from impressions that lie on the surface in Leningrad, lies in some remote future. It is not merely that even the leaders regard the present status as only an initial step, hardly complete even as a first step, but that the prevailing

economy is so distinctly a money economy to all outward appearances. We used to speculate what would have been our impression if we had arrived in Leningrad with no knowledge of past events and no antecedent expectations as to its economic status. It was, of course, impossible to denude the mind sufficiently of prior prepossessions to answer the query. But I had a strong feeling that, while I should have been conscious of a real psychological and moral difference from the rest of the world, the economic scene would not have seemed especially unlike that of any European country that has not yet recovered from the impoverishment of war, foreign and civil, blockade and famine.

At first, the impression was one of poverty, though not of dire want; rather a feeling that perhaps there was something to be said for all being poor alike, as if the only communism were that of sharing a common lot. But it did not require much time to enable the eye to make distinctions. One readily discriminated, by means of attire and bearing, at least four classes, or perhaps one should say grades, of the kind one meets in any large city of the world. The extremes are not so marked, especially on the side of luxury and display. The classes shade into one another more than one would find to be the case in New York or London. But the distinctions are there. Although fairly long lines are seen waiting at some shops, especially where food is sold, there are no marked signs of distress; the people are well nourished; theaters, restaurants, parks and places of amusement are thronged—and their prices are not cheap. The store windows are filled with the same kind of goods one sees anywhere, though usually of the quality associated with cheap bazaars, children's toys and cheap jewelry drawing the larger crowds at the windows, here as elsewhere. What money there is—and, as I have said, in quality if not quantity there is a purely money economy—is evidently in easy circulation.

I have confined myself to the impressions of the early days, at least to those which subsequent events deepened and confirmed, and to impressions that came directly and upon the surface, unaffected by questions, explanations and discussion. Special knowledge, gained later by more definite inquiry, put some of the earlier impressions in a modified light. Thus one learned that the chief reason why people spend money so freely, and on amusements as well as necessities, is because the entire political control is directed against personal accumulation, so that money counts as a means of direct and present enjoyment, not as a tool of future action. Similarly, as one goes below the surface, one's first impressions of the similarity of the economic system to that of any impoverished country is modified by knowledge that, while the régime is distinctly capitalistic, it is one of government rather than private capitalism. Yet these subsequent modifications converted impressions into ideas rather than annulled the first impressions themselves. The net result for me was that a definite reversal of perspective in preconceptions was effected. The sense of a vast human revolution that has brought with it-or rather that consists ofan outburst of vitality, courage, confidence in life has come to the front. The notion that the Revolution is essentially economic and industrial has in the same degree moved to the background-not that it is, even as far as it has already gone, insignificant, but that it now appears, not as the cause of the human, the psychological, revolution, but as an incident of it. Possibly it is only because of dullness that I did not reason out this conclusion at home. Looking back and judging in the light of history, it is perhaps just what one should have expected. But since the clamor of economic emphasis, coming, as I have said, from both defenders and enemies of the Bolshevik scheme, may have confused others as it certainly confused me, I can hardly do better than record the impression, as overwhelming as it was unexpected, that the outstanding fact in Russia is a revolution, involving a release of human powers on such an unprecedented scale that it is of incalculable significance not only for that country, but for the world.1

¹ Comments made since the original appearance of these sentences have shown me that my remarks upon the subordinate character of the economic phase of the revolution are too sweeping. I should not think of denying that the political aspect of the economic revolution in elevating labor, especially the interests of the factory workers, from the bottom of the social scale to the top is an integral factor in the psychological and moral transformation. [Note added in republication.]



II

A COUNTRY IN A STATE OF FLUX

I tried in my first article to give some account of the total feeling aroused in me by the face of Russian life as I saw it in Leningrad. It ought to be easier (and probably more instructive) to forgo the attempt to convey a single inclusive impression, in order to record, in separate fashion, ideas or emotions aroused by this or that particular contact. But the accomplishment of this latter task is made dif-

ficult by the fact that, without a prolonged stay, wide contacts and a knowledge of the language, accurate information is hard to come by. One gets about as many views as there are persons one converses with, even about things that might be supposed to be matters of fact; or else one finds questions evaded in an embarrassed way. (For some reason, this latter statement is much truer of experiences in Leningrad than in Moscow. Some things mentioned only in a whisper in the former city were loudly proclaimed in the latter; the atmosphere of avoidance changed to that of welcoming discussion. I do not know why this should have been so, but perhaps the pall of the past with its ruthlessness still hangs over one city, while the energy that looks to the future is centered in the other.)

For example, although one's chief concern is not with economic conditions, one naturally has a certain curiosity about that aspect of affairs, and asks questions. Here are a multitude of shops, selling to customers, to all appearances, for money and a money profit like similar shops in other parts of the world. How are they stocked and managed? How many are government-owned; how many are coöperative and what is the relation of cooperative undertakings to the State? How many are private enterprises? How is honest public accountability secured? What is the technique for regulating the temptation to profiteer on the side? The questions seem natural and innocent. But it was not easy to find their answers, nor did the answers, when given, agree very well with one another. In part, the explanation is simple enough; I did not apply to persons who were sufficiently interested to be well informed; any traveler knows how easy it is anywhere in the world to amass misinformation. But along with this fact and behind it there was a cause that seems to me of general significance, one that should be known and reckoned with in any attempt at appraisal of Russian affairs. Its nature may be illustrated by an answer that was often given me at first in reply to questions about the nature of cooperative stores; namely, that they were in effect merely government shops under another name. Later on, through access to more authoritative sources. I learned that the fact of the case was quite to the contrary; not only has the cooperative movement grown eight-fold since its very promising beginnings before the War, but its management is primarily of the autonomous, classic Rochdale type.1 From a certain point of view,

¹ This refers to the internal management of the coöperatives. Ultimate price-control is of course in the hands of the government. [Added note.]

perhaps one more important than that which I entertained during my visit, a report upon the development and prospects of cooperative undertakings in present-day Russia would be more significant than anything I have to say. But I am not an economist, and my purpose in alluding to this matter is not that of giving economic information. What I learned from my experience in this matter (rendered typical by a variety of similar experiences) is the necessity of giving an exact dating to every statement made about conditions in Soviet Russia. For there is every reason to believe that the misinformation I received about the status of coöperative undertakings in Russia was not only honestly given, but was based on recollection of conditions that obtained several years ago. For there was a time when the whole industrial structure of Russia was so disorganized, from the World War, the blockade and civil war, that the government practically took over the management of the coöperatives. (Even of this period it is important to know that the latter jealously safeguarded in legal form their autonomy by formally voting, as if they were their own independent decisions, the measures forced upon them by the government.) This state of affairs no longer exists: on the contrary, the free and democratically conducted coöperative movement has assumed a new vitality—subject, of course, to control of prices by the State. But ideas and beliefs formed during that period got into circulation and persist. Were I not convinced that the instance is typical, so typical that a large part of what passes for knowledge about Soviet Russia is in fact only reminiscence of what was the condition at some time during some phase of affairs, I should not dwell upon it at such length.

This necessity for exact dating of every statement made about Russian conditions, if one is to have any criterion of its value, is indicative of a fact—or a force—that to my mind is much more significant than most of the "facts"—even when they are really facts that are most widely diffused. For they indicate the extent to which Russia is in a state of flux, of rapid alterations, even oscillations. If I learned nothing else, I learned to be immensely suspicious of all generalized views about Russia; even if they accord with the state of affairs in 1922 or 1925, they may have little relevancy to 1928, and perhaps be of only antiquarian meaning by 1933. As foreigners resident in the country frequently put it to me, Russia lives in all its internal problems and policies from hand to mouth; only in foreign politics is there consistency and unity. In the mouths of those sympathetic with what is going on in Russia, the formula had a commendatory implication; the flux was a sign that those who are managing affairs have an attitude of realistic adaptation to actual conditions and needs. In the mouths of the unsympathetic, the phrase implied incapacity on the part of the rulers, in that they had no fixed mind of their own, even on important matters. But the fact of change, whether favorably or unfavorably interpreted, remained outstanding and unchallenged. In view of current notions (which I confess I shared before my visit) about the rigidity of affairs in Russia, I am convinced that this fact of change and flux needs all the emphasis that can possibly be given it.

While my preconception as to the rigidity of affairs in Russia was the one which turned out most contrary to facts, it may not be one that is widely shared. But there are other preconceptions—most of which I am happy to say I

did not share—which seem after a visit even more absurd. One of them is indicated by the question so often asked both before and after the visit: How did the party dare to go to Russia?—as if life there were rude, disorderly and insecure. One hesitates to speak of this notion to an intelligent public, but I have found it so widely current that I am sure that testimony to the orderly and safe character of life in Russia would be met with incredulity by much more than half of the European as well as the American public. In spite of secret police, inquisitions, arrests and deportations of Nepmen and Kulaks, exiling of party opponents-including divergent elements in the party—life for the masses goes on with regularity, safety and decorum. If I wished to be invidious. I could mention other countries in Eastern Europe in which it is much more annoying to travel. There is no country in

Europe in which the external routine of life is more settled and secure. Even the "wild children" who have formed the staple of so many tales have now disappeared from the streets of the large cities.

Another warning that appears humorous in retrospect is that so often given by kindly friends, against being fooled by being taken to see show places. It is hard to exercise imagination in one environment about conditions in a remote and strange country; but it now seems as if it would not have required great imagination to realize that the Russians had enough to do on their own account without bothering to set up show establishments to impress a few hundred—or even thousand—tourists. The places and institutions that were "shown" us -and the Leningrad Society for Cultural Relations had prepared a most interesting program of sight-seeing-were show-places in the sense that they were well worthy of being shown. I hope they were the best of their kind, so as to be representative of what the new régime is trying to do; there is enough mediocrity everywhere without traveling thousands of miles to see it. But they exist for themselves, either because of historic conditions, like the old palaces and treasures, or because of present urgent needs. Some of the resorts for workers' vacation periods on the island in the Neva River had a somewhat perfunctory air; the old palatial residence, now used as a workers' summer club-house, seemed to have no special active functions. The much advertised "Wall-newspaper" seemed, when its contents were translated, much like what would elsewhere have been less ambitiously called a bulletin board. But such episodes only brought out by contrast the vitality of other institutions, and the gay spontaneity of the "Wall-newspapers" in the children's colonies and homes.

Of the "sights" contained in the official program, the one enduringly impressed in memory is a visit to a children's colony in a former Grand Duke's summer palace in Peterhof-up the Neva from Leningrad. The place marks the nearest approach of the White Armies to Leningrad; the buildings were more or less ruined in the warfare, and are not yet wholly restored, since the teachers and children must do the work; there is still need in some quarters for hot water and whitewash. Two-thirds of the children are former "wild children," orphans, refugees, etc., taken from the streets. There is nothing surprising, not to say unique, in the existence of orphan asylums. I do not cite the presence of this one as evidence of any special care taken of the young by the Bolshevik government. But taken as evidence of the native capacity of the Russian stock, it was more impressive than my command of words permits me to record. I have never seen anywhere in the world such a large proportion of intelligent, happy, and intelligently occupied children. They were not lined up for inspection. We walked about the grounds and found them engaged in their various summer occupations, gardening, bee-keeping, repairing buildings, growing flowers in a conservatory (built and now managed by a group of particularly tough boys who began by destroying everything in sight), making simple tools and agricultural implements, etc. Not what they were doing, but their manner and attitude is, however, what stays with me—I cannot convey it: I lack the necessary literary skill. But the net impression will always remain. If the children had come from the most advantageously situated families, the scene would have been a remarkable one, unprecedented in my experience. When their almost unimaginable earlier history and background were taken into account, the effect was to leave me with the profoundest admiration for the capacities of the people from which they sprang, and an unshakable belief in what they can accomplish. I am aware that there is a marked disproportion between the breadth of my conclusion and the narrowness of the experience upon which it rests. But the latter did not remain isolated; though it never recurred in the same fullness, it was renewed in every institution of children and youth which I visited. And in any case, I feel bound to let the statement stand; its seemingly exaggerated quality will at least testify to the depth of the impression I received of the intrinsic capacity of the Russian people, of the release the Revolution has effected, of the intelligence and sympathetic art with which the new conditions are being taken advantage of educationally by some of the wisest and most devoted men and women it has ever been my fortune to meet.

Since I am dealing only with impressions received at first hand and not with information proceeding from systematic inquiries, I shall conclude with selecting two other impressions, each of which happened to arise apart from any official guidance. The hours of several days of leisure time before the arrival of the party of fellow American educators in Leningrad were spent in the Hermitage. Of this museum as a treasure house of European painting it is unnecessary to speak. Not so of the human visitors, groups of peasants, working men, grown men and women much more than youth, who came in bands of from thirty to fifty, each with a leader eager and alert. Every day we met these bands, twenty or thirty different ones. The like of it is not to be seen anywhere else in the world. And this experience was not isolated. It was repeated in every museum, artistic, scientific, historical, we visited. The wondering question that arose in me the first day, whether there was not a phase of the Revolution, and a most important one, which had not before dawned upon me, became, as time went on, almost an obsession. Perhaps the most significant thing in Russia, after all, is not the effort at economic transformation, but the will to use an economic change as the means of developing a popular cultivation, especially an esthetic one, such as the world has never known.

I can easily imagine the incredulity such a statement arouses in the minds of those fed only by accounts of destructive Bolshevik activities. But I am bound in honesty to record the bouleversement of the popular foreign impression which took place in my own case. This new educative struggle may not succeed; it has

to face enormous obstacles; it has been too much infected with propagandist tendencies. But in my opinion the latter will gradually die of inanition in the degree in which Soviet Russia feels free and secure in working out its own destiny. The main effort is nobly heroic, evincing a faith in human nature which is democratic beyond the ambitions of the democracies of the past.

The other impression I would record came from a non-official visit to a House of Popular Culture. Here was a fine new building in the factory quarter, surrounded by recreation grounds, provided with one large theater, four smaller assembly halls, fifty rooms for club-meetings, recreation and games, headquarters for trade unions, costing two million dollars, frequented daily—or rather, nightly—by five thousand persons as a daily average. Built and controlled, perhaps, by the government? No,

but by the voluntary efforts of the trade unions, who tax themselves two percent of their wages to afford their collective life these facilities. The House is staffed and managed by its own elected officers. The contrast with the comparative inactivity of our own working men and with the quasi-philanthropic quality of similar enterprises in my own country left a painful impression. It is true that this House —there is already another similar one in Leningrad—has no intrinsic and necessary connection with communistic theory and practice. The like of it might exist in any large modern industrial center. But there is the fact that the like of it does *not* exist in the other and more highly developed industrial centers. There it is in Leningrad, as it is not there in Chicago or New York: 2 and there it is in a society sup-

² The Amalgamated Center in Chicago should perhaps be excepted.

IMPRESSIONS OF SOVIET RUSSIA

posedly rigidly managed by the State on the basis of dogmatic theory, as an evidence of the vitality of organized voluntary initiative and coöperative effort. What does this mean? If I knew the answer, perhaps I should have the beginning of an understanding of what is really going on in Soviet Russia.



III

A NEW WORLD IN THE MAKING

Two remarks were frequently heard in Leningrad. One was that that city was an outpost of Europe, rather than truly Russian; the other was that Moscow is authentic Russia and is semi-oriental. I should not venture to put my brief experience against these statements, but it may be of some use to tell wherein it differed. Leningrad, while in no sense oriental, hardly struck me as European, and present-day Moscow, at least, appeared ultrawestern. As to the first city, its architects were

indeed imported from Italy, and perhaps intended to reproduce a European city. But if so, the spirit of the place entered their minds and took control of their hands and they constructed something of which they had no prescience. And the genius loci, the lustrous sky, the illimitable horizon, the extravagant and tempestuous climate, did not remind me of any Europe previously known. As to Moscow, while there is something semi-oriental in its physical structure and while orientals throng portions of the city, its psychic aspect and figure are far from what is associated with the slow-moving and ancient East. For in spirit and intent, Moscow is new, nervously active, mobile; newer, it seemed to me, than any city in our own country, even than a frontier town.

Of the two cities, it was Leningrad that seemed ancient. Of course, history tells a

different story, and if I were writing as an historian or antiquarian, I should speak differently. But if one takes Moscow immediately, as it presents itself to the eye and communicates itself to the nerves, it is a place of constant, restless movement, to the point of tension, which imparts the sense of a creative energy that is concerned only with the future. In contrast, Leningrad speaks, even mournfully, of the past. We all know a certain legend appropriate to the lips and pen of the European visitor to America: here is a land inhabited by a strangely young folk, with the buoyancy, energy, naïveté and immaturity of youth and inexperience. That is the way Moscow impressed me, and very much more so than my own country. There, indeed, was a life full of hope, of confidence, almost hyperactive, naïve at times and on some subjects incredibly

so, having the courage that achieves much because it springs from that ignorance of youth that is not held back by fears born from too many memories. Freed from the load of subjection to the past, it seems charged with the ardor of creating a new world. At one point the comparison fails. Running through the élan, there is a tempering sense of the infinite difficulty of the task which had been undertaken (I speak of the educational leaders with whom alone we had contact). It cannot be said that they are depressed, but they appear, along with all their hopeful enthusiasm, as if borne on contending currents that make it uncertain whether they will come to the port they envisage, or be overwhelmed. The union of spontaneity and humor with fundamental seriousness may or may not be a Russian trait; it certainly marked the men and women who are

carrying the load of creating, by means of education, a new mentality in the Russian people.

Our stay in Moscow thus differed markedly from the Leningrad visit. The latter was more of the nature of sight-seeing carried on under most favorable auspices, leaving us to form our own ideas from what we saw and had contact with. But Moscow is more than a political center. It is the heart of the energies that go pulsing throughout all Russia, that Russia which includes so much of Asia as well as of Europe. Hence it was that in Moscow one had the feeling as one visited various institutions that one was coming into intimate contact, almost a vicarious share, in a creative labor, in a world in the making. It was as if, after having seen in Leningrad monuments of the past and some products of the present, we were

now suddenly let into the operative process itself. Naturally the new experience modified as well as deepened the Leningrad impressions that I have already recorded. The deepening was of the sense of energy and vigor released by the Revolution; the modification was a sense of the planned constructive endeavor which the new régime is giving this liberated energy.

I am only too conscious, as I write, how strangely fantastic the idea of hope and creation in connection with Bolshevist Russia must appear to those whose beliefs about it were fixed, not to be changed, some seven or eight years ago. I certainly was not prepared for what I saw; it came as a shock. The question that has most often been asked me (along with the question whether there is any freedom there), is whether there is anything constructive going on. The currency of the question indicated the hold that the reports of the

destructive character of Bolshevism still have upon the public imagination, and perhaps increases the obligation incumbent upon one who has experienced a different face to events, to record the effect of that experience. So, before speaking of the more positively significant aspect of constructive effort, it may be worth while to say (what, indeed, so many visitors have already stated) that in the great cities, what impresses one is the conserving, rather than the destructive, character of the Revolution. There is much more in the England that has come to us from Henry the Eighth of the sort that is associated with Bolshevist rage than there is in Moscow and Leningrad. Having just come from England and with the memories of ruin and vandalism fresh in mind, I often wished that there might be prepared for the special benefit of the die-hard Anglo-Saxon mind (which is American as well as British) an inventory of the comparative destruction of art and architecture in the revolutions of the two countries. One positive sign of interest in conservation is the enormous enlargement and multiplication of museums that has occurred in Russia. For the establishment of museums and the pious care of historic and artistic treasures are not the sort of thing that prevails where the spirit of destruction is supreme. There are now almost a hundred museums in Moscow alone, and through the country, in provincial towns, they have multiplied under the present régime more than five times, while the efforts to render their treasures accessible and useful to the people have kept pace with the numerical increase.

Contrary, again, to the popular myth, this work of conservation has included the temples of the Orthodox Church and their art treasures. All that has been said of the anti-clerical and

atheistic tendencies of the Bolshevist is true enough. But the churches and their contents that were of artistic worth are not only intact, but taken care of with scrupulous and even scientific zeal. It is true that many have been converted into museums, but to all appearances there are still enough to meet the needs of would-be worshipers. The collections of ikons in museums in Leningrad and Moscow are an experience which repays the lover of art for a voyage to these cities. In the Kremlin the aid of experts, antiquarians, scholars of history, chemists has been enlisted in beginning the work of highly important restoration. There was, indeed, a "restoration," of the type with which one is too familiar, undertaken in the old régime; the lovely primitives of the frescoes were, for example, gaudily repainted by "artists" of a higher-grade house-painting sort. This work is now undoing; meretricious ornaments, the product of a combination of superstition, too much money and execrable taste, are stripped off. When the work is completed, the Bolshevist régime, in spite of seemingly more urgent demands on time and money, will have recovered in its pristine charm one of the great historic monuments of the world.

Were it not for the popular impression of Bolshevist Russia as given over to mad destructiveness, such things would perhaps be worthy only of passing note. But as things stand, they take on a significance which is typical. They are symbolic not only of constructive activity, but of the direction in which, to my mind, this work of construction is vital: the formation of a popular culture impregnated with esthetic quality. It is no accident that Lunacharsky, to whom, most of all, the careful conservation of the historic and artistic treasures of Russia is due, is the Commissar of Education. For while

a revival of interest in artistic production, literary, musical, plastic, is characteristic of progressive schools all over the world, there is no country, unless it be possibly Mexico, where the esthetic aim and quality so dominates all things educational as in Russia today. It pervades not only the schools, but that which, for the lack of a better word, one must call "adult education"—ludicrously insufficient as is that term, in the meaning it derives from activities in our own country, to convey the organized widespread diffusion and expansion taking place in the country of "destructive" Bolshevism. There is a peculiar tone of irony that hangs over all the preconceptions about Russia that one finds current, and which one has come unconsciously more or less to share. But perhaps the contrast between the popular notion of universal absorption in materialistic economy and the actual facts of devotion to creation of living art and to universal participation in the processes and the products of art strikes the ironic note most intensely.

I write, as perhaps I should remind the reader more frequently, from the angle of educational endeavor; I can speak of Russia with any degree of confidence only as the animating purpose and life of that country are reflected in its educational leaders and the work they are attempting. The reader will naturally ask a question which I have often addressed to myself: How far is the impression gained in this particular reflection a just one with reference to the spirit and aim of Soviet Russia as a whole? That one gets from this particular point of view an idea of that spirit and aim in its best and most attractive, because most constructive, aspect, I freely recognize. But while conceding that the picture formed in this particular reflection is purer and clearer than one

could or would get from studying the political or the economic phases of life, I must also record my conviction that it is fundamentally a truer picture as well. It is, of course, impossible for me to cite objective evidence that would justify the reader in sharing this conviction. I may, however, indicate the nature of the grounds upon which there gradually grew up in my own mind the belief that one can appreciate the inner meaning of the new Russian life more intimately and justly by contact with educational effort than with specific political and industrial conditions.

Some of the grounds may be classed as negative: the failure of what I have read, when written from an exclusively political and economic point of view, to convey a sense of reality in comparison with what was personally felt and seen from the educational side. The books contain, some of them, much more in-

formation than I shall ever possess; they are written, some of them, by men who know the Russian language and who have had wide contacts. If, then, I indulge in the presumption of trusting my own impressions rather than their reports in some vital matters, it is not because I think they have—again, some of them-wilfully falsified; nor, indeed, because of what they say, but rather because of what they do not say, what they have left out, and which I am sure is there. Consequently, these works affect me as marked by a certain vacuity, an emptiness due to an insensitiveness to what is most vitally significant. They present static cross-sections isolated from the movement which alone gives them meaning.

These remarks are doubtless too indefinite, too much at large, to be illuminating. Possibly they may gain definiteness by reference to a particular book, and I select Kalgren's "Bol-

shevist Russia." There is no doubt of the competency of the author's knowledge of the language, or his assiduity in collecting data; I do not question the honesty of his aims; the authenticity of most of his material is vouched for by the fact that it is derived from Bolshevist sources. Why not, then, accept his almost wholly unfavorable conclusions? In part because the book does not sufficiently date its material; it does not indicate the special context of time and conditions under which the evils reported occurred. But in greater part because I fail utterly to get from the book the sense of the quality of moving events which contact with these events gives. In consequence, admitting that all of the evils complained of existed at some time and place, and that many of them still exist, the total effect is dead, empty, evacuated of vital significance. Take, as one instance, the very fact that Bolshevist sources are themselves drawn upon for the mass of damning facts. The net effect of this material is one thing when taken by itself, as a pile of ultimate isolated facts which are self-explanatory. It is quite another thing when taken as evidence of a characteristic tendency. For when one looks for some positive and ruling endeavor with which the collection and publication of these condemnatory data are connected, one finds himself in the presence of a deliberate and systematic effort at exploration and self-examination which is unparalleled in other countries. And in turn one finds this movement to be connected with a belief in the reality of a science of society, as a basis for diagnosis of social ills and projection of constructive change. One may not believe in the alleged "science," but disbelief does not alter the fact that one gets a dead and distorted idea from the report of isolated facts, however

authentic, until they have been brought into relation with the intellectual movement of selfcriticism of which they are a part.

The positive reason for attaching primary significance to this intellectual movement, and for thinking of it as educational, is the fact that by the necessities of the case the central problem of the Soviet leaders is the production of a new mentality, a new "ideology," to employ one of the three or four words that one hears the most frequently. There can be no doubt of the tenacity with which the dogma of "economic determinism" is held to; it is an article of faith that the content and temper of ideas and beliefs which currently prevail are fixed by economic institutions and processes. But it is not true that the prevalent Marxian economic materialism denies efficacy to ideas and beliefs—to the current "ideology," whatever that is. On the contrary, it is held that, while originally this is an effect of economic causes, it becomes in time itself a secondary cause which operates "reciprocally." Hence, from the communist standpoint, the problem is not only that of replacing capitalistic by collectivistic economic institutions, but also one of substituting a collective mentality for the individualistic psychology inherited from the "bourjui" epoch—a psychology which is still ingrained in most of the peasants and most of the intellectuals as well as in the trading class itself. Thus the movement is caught in a circular predicament, only it would be officially described as an instance and proof of "dialec-Ultimate popular ideology is to be determined by communistic institutions; but meantime the success of their efforts to introduce these institutions is dependent upon ability to create a new mentality, a new psychological attitude. And obviously this latter

problem is essentially one of education. It accounts for the extraordinary importance assumed in the present phase of Russian life by educational agencies. And in accounting for their importance, it enables one to use them as a magnifying glass of great penetrating power by which to read the spirit of events in their constructive phase.

An incidental confirmation of the central position, during the present state of "transition," of educational agencies is the omnipresence of propaganda. The present age is, of course, everywhere one in which propaganda has assumed the rôle of a governing power. But nowhere else in the world is employment of it as a tool of control so constant, consistent and systematic as in Russia at present. Indeed, it has taken on such importance and social dignity that the word propaganda hardly carries, in another social medium, the correct

meaning. For we instinctively associate propaganda with the accomplishing of some special ends, more or less private to a particular class or group, and correspondingly concealed from others. But in Russia the propaganda is in behalf of a burning public faith. One may believe that the leaders are wholly mistaken in the object of their faith, but their sincerity is beyond question. To them the end for which propaganda is employed is not a private or even a class gain, but is the universal good of universal humanity. In consequence, propaganda is education and education is propaganda. They are more than confounded; they are identified.

When I speak, then, of educational agencies, I mean something much wider than the operation of the school system. Of the latter as such, I hope to write something later. But here I am concerned with it only as a part of

the evidence that the essential constructive work of present-day-or "transitional"-Russia is intrinsically educational. In this particular aspect, the work of the schools finds its meaning expressed in words one often hears: "Nothing can be done with the older generation as a whole. Its 'ideology' was fixed by the older régime; we can only wait for them to die. Our positive hope is in the younger generation." But the office of the schools in creating a new "ideology" cannot be understood in isolation; it is part of a "reciprocal" operation. Political and economic changes and measures are themselves, during the present period, essentially educational; they are conceived of not only as preparing the external conditions for an ulterior communistic régime, but even more as creating an atmosphere, an environment, favorable to a collectivistic mentality. The mass of the people is to learn the

meaning of Communism not so much by induction into Marxian doctrines—although there is plenty of that in the schools—but by what is done for the mass in freeing their life, in giving them a sense of security, safety, in opening to them access to recreation, leisure, new enjoyments and new cultivations of all sorts. The most effective propaganda, as the most effective education, is found to be that of deeds which raise the level of popular life, making it fuller and richer, while associating the gains as indissolubly as possible with a "collective" mentality.

I may perhaps best sum up the difference between my Leningrad and Moscow impressions by saying that in the latter place the notion of the present as a "transition" took on a new significance. My feeling when I left Leningrad, put baldly, was that the Revolution was a great success, while Communism was a frost. My experience in Moscow did not alter the latter impression to the extent of convincing me that there is in practice any more actual Communism than I had supposed that there was. But those experiences convinced me that there is an enormous constructive effort taking place in the creation of a new collective mentality; a new morality I should call it, were it not for the aversion of Soviet leaders to all moral terminology; and that this endeavor is actually succeeding to a considerable degree—to just what extent, I cannot, of course, measure.

Thus the "transition" appears to be in considerable degree a fact. Towards what it is a transition seems to me, however, a still wholly undetermined matter. To the orthodox Marxian, the goal is, of course, certain; it is just the communistic institutions his special philosophy of history requires. But personally, I am

strongly of the impression that the more successful are the efforts to create a new mentality and a new morality of a cooperative social type, the more dubious is the nature of the goal that will be attained. For, I am wholly inclined to believe, this new attitude of mind, in just the degree in which it is really new and revolutionary, will create its own future society according to its own desires and purposes. This future society will undoubtedly be highly unlike the régime characteristic of the western world of private capital and individual profit. But I think the chances are that it will be equally unlike the society which orthodox Marxian formulæ call for.

I hope the tone of what I have written makes it clear that I am dealing with impressions rather than with matters capable of any objective proof. I can readily understand that I may put a higher estimate on the value and validity of my personal impressions than I can expect anyone else to do. But even if my impressions are not only inadequate, which they are sure to be, but also quite wrong, I feel bound to record the one impression which my contacts in Moscow wrote most indelibly in my mind: the final significance of what is taking place in Russia is not to be grasped in political or economic terms, but is found in change, of incalculable importance, in the mental and moral disposition of a people, an educational transformation. This impression, I fear, deviates widely from the belief of both the devotees and the enemies of the Bolshevik régime. But it is stamped in my mind and I must record it for what it is.



IV

WHAT ARE THE RUSSIAN SCHOOLS DOING?

I GAVE in my last article some reasons for believing that in the "transitional" state of Russia chief significance attaches to the mental and moral (pace the Marxians) change that is taking place; that while in the end this transformation is supposed to be a means to economic and political change, for the present

it is the other way around. This consideration is equivalent to saying that the import of all institutions is educational in the broad sense that of their effects upon disposition and attitude. Their function is to create habits so that persons will act coöperatively and collectively as readily as now in capitalistic countries they act "individualistically." The same consideration defines the importance and the purpose of the narrower educational agencies, the schools. They represent a direct and concentrated effort to obtain the effect which other institutions develop in a diffused and roundabout manner. The schools are, in current phrase, the "ideological arm of the Revolution." In consequence, the activities of the schools dovetail in the most extraordinary way, both in administrative organization and in aim and spirit, into all other social agencies and interests.

IMPRESSIONS OF SOVIET RUSSIA

The connection that exists in the minds of Soviet educators between the formation of attitudes and dispositions by domestic, industrial and political institutions and by the school may perhaps be indicated by reference to the account given, by one of the leaders of the new education, of his own development. His efforts at educational reform date back to the early years of this century, when he joined with a fellow Russian (who had been connected with the University Settlement in New York City) in conducting a social settlement in the working men's quarter in Moscow. Naturally they were compelled to operate along non-political lines and in the neutral fields of children's clubs, recreation, health, etc.; in fact, in the familiar fields of our own settlements of the distinctively philanthropic type. Even so, they met with constant opposition and embarrassment from the old régime. For example, the

educator who told this story was one of the first to introduce football into Russia; in consequence, he spent several months in jail. For the authorities were convinced that there could be only one object in playing the game: namely, to train young men so that they could throw bombs more accurately! (Incidentally, I may remark that the spread of sports and games is one of the characteristic features of existing social life; one Sunday afternoon, for example, we attended a trotting match sponsored by the horse-breeding department of the government commissariat of agriculture, and a soccer match, each having an audience of fifteen to twenty thousand persons.) In 1911, wishing a broader field, he started an educational experimental station in the country, some eighty or a hundred miles distant from Moscow, getting assistance from well-to-do Russians of liberal temper. This school, so I was informed, was based on a combination of Tolstoy's version of Rousseau's doctrine of freedom and the idea of the educational value of productive work derived from American sources.

The story thus far is of some historical significance in indicating some of the causal factors in the present Soviet educational system. But its chief value depends upon a further development; especially the effect upon the minds of educational reformers of the constant opposition of established authority to even the most moderate and non-political efforts at educational reform and amelioration of the condition of the working population. The educator of whom I am speaking began as a liberal reformer, not a radical but a constitutional democrat. He worked in the faith and hope that the school, through giving a new type of education, might peacefully and gradually

produce the required transformations in other institutions. His pilgrim's progress from reforming pedagogue to convinced communist affords a symbol of the social phase of the entire Soviet educational movement. In the first place, there was the striking and unescapable fact that those reforming and progressive endeavors which were hampered in every possible way by the Tsar's régime were actively and officially promoted by the Bolshevist régime, a fact that certainly influenced many liberal intellectuals to lend their coöperation to the Bolshevist government. One of them, not a party member, told me that he thought those intellectuals who had refused to cooperate wherever they could with the new government had made a tragic mistake; they had nullified their own power and had deprived Russia of assistance just when it was most needed. As for himself, he had found that the

present government cleared the way for just the causes he had had at heart in the old régime, and whose progress had always been hopelessly compromised by its opposition; and that, although he was not a communist, he found his advice and even his criticism welcomed, as soon as the authorities recognized that he was sincerely trying to coöperate. And I may add that, while my experience was limited, I saw liberal intellectuals who had pursued both the policy he deplored and the one he recommended. There is no more unhappy and futile class on earth than the first, and none more fully alive and happy—in spite of narrowly restricted economic conditions, living quarters, salaries, etc.—than the second.

This first consideration, the almost unimaginable contrast between the career and fate of social aspirations under the old régime and

under the Soviet government, is something to which I, at least, had not given due weight in my prior estimates of Bolshevist Russia. And I imagine there are many who, while they are aware in a general way of the repressive and despotic character of the Tsar's government, unconsciously form their appraisal of the present Russian system by putting it in contrast with an imaginary democratic system. They forget that for the Russian millions the contrast is with the system of which alone they have had actual experience. The Russian system of government at the present time is like that to which the population has been accustomed for centuries, namely, a personal system; like the old system, it has many repressive traits. But viewed in the only way which the experience of the masses makes possible for them, it is one that has opened to them doors that were formerly shut and bolted; it is as

interested in giving them access to sources of happiness as the only other government with which they have any acquaintance was to keep them in misery. This fact, and not that of espionage and police restriction, however excessive the latter may be, explains the stability of the present government, in spite of the comparatively small number of communists in the country. It relegates to the realm of pure fantasy those policies for dealing with Russia that are based on the notion that the present government is bound to fall from internal causes if only it can be sufficiently boycotted and isolated externally. I know of nothing that is more indicative of the state of illusion in which it is possible for isolated groups to live than the fact that, of five or six Russian dailies published by the émigrés in Paris, three are devoted to restoration of the monarchy.

I have become involved in a diversion,

though one naturally suggested by the marvelous development of progressive educational ideas and practices under the fostering care of the Bolshevist government—and I am speaking of what I have seen and not just been told about. However, the second factor that operated in the transformation of the educator (whose history I regard as typical and symbolic) takes us out of the region of reforming and progressive ideas into that of communism proper. It is the factor that would, I am sure, be emphasized by every communist educator rather than that which I have just mentioned. The frustration of educational aims by economic conditions occupied a much larger place in the story of the pilgrim's progress from pedagogy to communism than did explicit and definite political and governmental opposition. In fact, the latter was mentioned only as an inevitable by-product of the former. There are, as he puts it, two educations, the greater and the smaller. The lesser is given by the school; the larger, and the one finally influential, is given by the actual conditions of life, especially those of the family and neighborhood. And according to his own story, this educator found that the work he was trying to do in the school, even under the relatively very favorable conditions of his experimental school, was undone by the educative—or miseducative —formation of disposition and mental habit proceeding from the environment. Hence he became convinced that the social medium and the progressive school must work together, must operate in harmony, reinforcing each other, if the aim of the progressive school was not to be constantly undermined and dissipated; with the growth of this conviction he became insensibly a communist. He became convinced that the central force in undoing the work of

socialized reform he was trying to achieve by means of school agencies was precisely the egoistic and private ideals and methods inculcated by the institution of private property, profit and acquisitive possession.

The story is instructive because of its typically symbolic character; if it were expanded, it would also lead into an account of the definite content of Soviet school activities in the concrete. For as far as the influence of this particular educator is concerned (and it extends very far), the subject-matter, the methods of teaching, and the spirit of school administration and discipline are all treated as ways of producing harmony of operation between concrete social conditions-taking into account their local diversity—and school procedures. My contacts were not sufficiently prolonged to enable me, even if space permitted, to give an adequate report of the structure and technique of this work of harmonization. But its general spirit may at least be suggested. During the transitional régime, the school cannot count upon the larger education to create in any single and whole-hearted way the required collective and cooperative mentality. The traditional customs and institutions of the peasant, his small tracts, his three-system farming, the influence of home and Church, all work automatically to create in him an individualistic ideology. In spite of the greater inclination of the city worker towards collectivism, even his social environment works adversely in many respects. Hence the great task of the school is to counteract and transform those domestic and neighborhood tendencies that are still so strong. even in a nominally collectivistic régime.

In order to accomplish this end, the teachers must in the first place know with great detail and accuracy just what the conditions are to which pupils are subject in the home, and thus be able to interpret the habits and acts of the pupil in the school in the light of his environing conditions—and this, not just in some general way, but as definitely as a skilled physician diagnoses in the light of their causes the diseased conditions with which he is dealing. So this educator described his philosophy as "Social Behaviorism." Whatever he saw, a mode of farming, farm implements, style of home construction, domestic industry, church building, etc., led him to ask for its probable effect upon the behavior of those who were subject to its influence. On the other hand the teacher strove to learn, whenever he was confronted with any mode of undesirable behavior on the part of a pupil, how to trace it back to its definite social causation. Such an idea, however illuminating in the abstract, would, of course, remain barren without some technique to carry it into effect. And one of the most interesting pedagogical innovations with which I am acquainted is the technique which has been worked out for enabling teachers to discover the actual conditions that influence pupils in their out-of-school life; and I hope someone with more time than I had at command will before long set forth the method in detail. Here I can only say that it involves, among other things, discussions in connection with history and geography, the themes of written work, the compositions of pupils, and also a detailed study throughout the year of home and family budgets. Quite apart from any economic theory, communistic or individualistic, the results are already of great pedagogical value, and promise to provide a new and fruitful method of sociological research.

The knowledge thus gained of home condi-

tions and their effect upon behavior (and I may say in passing that this social behaviorism seems to me much more promising intellectually than any exclusively physiological behaviorism can ever prove to be) is preliminary to the development of methods which will enable schools to react favorably upon the undesirable conditions discovered, and to reinforce such desirable agencies as exist. Here, of course, is the point at which the socially constructive work of the school comes in. A little something will be said about this later in detail, when I come to speak of the idea of "socially useful" work as a criterion for deciding upon the value of "projects"—for Soviet education is committed to the "project method." But aside from its practical working out, it is also interesting in that it locates one of the burning points of present Russian pedagogical theoretical education. For there is still a school that holds that educational principles can be derived from psychology and biology—although the weight of citations from Marx is now eclipsing their influence—and that correct educational methods are bound to produce the desired effect independently of concrete knowledge of domestic and local environment.

I have dwelt too long on certain general considerations, at the expense of any account of what schools are actually doing and how they are doing it. My excuse is that, in relation to the entire Russian situation, it is these generic points of social aspiration and contact that are significant. That which distinguishes the Soviet schools both from other national systems and from the progressive schools of other countries (with which they have much in common) is precisely the conscious control of every educational procedure by reference to a single and comprehensive social purpose. It is this refer-

ence that accounts for the social interlocking to which I referred at the outset. The point may be illustrated by the bearing of school activity upon the family institution as that is conceived by the orthodox Marxian socialists. That thorough-going collectivists regard the traditional family as exclusive and isolating in effect and hence as hostile to a truly communal life, is too familiar to require rehearsal. Apart, however, from the effect of the oft-recited Bolshevist modifications of marriage and divorce, the institution of the family is being sapped indirectly rather than by frontal attack; its historic supports, economic and ecclesiastical, are weakened. For example, the limitation of living quarters, enforced in Russia as in other countries by the War, is deliberately taken advantage of to create social combinations wider than that of the family and that cut across its ties. There is no word one hears oftener than Gruppe, and all sorts of groups are instituted that militate against the primary social importance of the family unit. In consequence, to anyone who looks at the matter cold-bloodedly, free from sentimental associations clustering about the historic family institution, a most interesting sociological experimentation is taking place, the effect of which should do something to determine how far the bonds that hold the traditional family together are intrinsic and how far due to extraneous causes; and how far the family in its accustomed form is a truly socializing agency and how far a breeder of non-social interests.

Our special concern here is with the rôle of the schools in building up forces and factors whose natural effect is to undermine the importance and uniqueness of family life. It is obvious to any observer that in every western

country the increase of importance of public schools has been at least coincident with a relaxation of older family ties. What is going on in Russia appears to be a planned acceleration of this process. For example, the earliest section of the school system, dealing with children from three to seven, aims, in the cities, to keep children under its charge six, eight and ten hours per day, and in ultimate ideal (although far from present fact) this procedure is to be universal and compulsory. When it is carried out, the effect on family life is too evident to need to be dwelt upon—although at present even in Moscow only one-tenth of the children of this age are in such schools. Nor does the invasion of family life stop at this point in dealing with young children. There are in contemplation summer colonies in the country, corresponding to our fresh-air homes for children from slums, in which children from these all-day "kindergarten" schools will spend a large part of the summer months. Some of the summer colonies are already in existence; those visited compare favorably with similar institutions anywhere, with respect to food, hygiene, medical attention and daily nurture. Now, it would be too much to say that these institutions are deliberately planned with sole reference to their disintegrating effect upon family life; there are doubtless other more conspicuous causes. They are part of a whole network of agencies by means of which the Soviet government is showing its special care for the laboring class in order to gain its political support, and to give a working object-lesson in the value of a communistic scheme. One derives from this, as from many other social undertakings, the impression that the Soviet authorities are trying to forestall, in a deliberately

planned and wholesale manner, those consequences of industrialization which in other countries have crept upon society piece-meal and unconsciously. For every large industrial center in any western country shows that in fact the effect of machine industrialization has been to disintegrate the traditional family. From this point of view, the Russian government is doing on a large scale what private philanthropy has done in our cities by means of crèches, etc. But even when these allowances are made, it remains true that we have here a striking exemplification of the conscious and systematic utilization of the school in behalf of a definite social policy. There are many elements of propaganda connected with this policy, and many of them obnoxious to me personally. But the broad effort to employ the education of the young as a means of realizing

certain social purposes cannot be dismissed as propaganda without relegating to that category all endeavor at deliberate social control.

Reference to this phase of Soviet education may perhaps be suitably concluded by a quotation from Lenin that has become a part of the canonical scriptures of Bolshevist educational literature. For it indicates that, were it necessary, official authority could be cited for the seemingly extreme statements I have made about the central position of the schools in the production of a communist ideology as a condition of the successful operation of communist institutions. "The school, apart from life, apart from politics, is a lie, a hypocrisy. Bourgeois society indulged in this lie, covering up the fact that it was using the schools as a means of domination, by declaring that the school was politically neutral, and in the service of

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all. We must declare openly what it concealed, namely, the political function of the school. While the object of our previous struggle was to overthrow the bourgeoisie, the aim of the new generation is much more complex: It is to construct communist society."





V

NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW ERA

THE idea of a school in which pupils, and therefore, studies and methods, are connected with social life, instead of being isolated, is one familiar in educational theory. In some form, it is the idea that underlies all attempts at thorough-going educational reform. What is characteristic of Soviet education is not, there-

fore, the idea of a dovetailing of school activities into out-of-school social activities, but the fact that for the first time in history there is an educational system officially organized on the basis of this principle. Instead of being exemplified, as it is with ourselves, in a few scattering schools that are private enterprises, it has the weight and authority of the whole régime behind it. In trying to satisfy my mind as to how and why it was that the educational leaders have been able in so short a time to develop a working model of this sort of education, with so little precedent upon which to fall back, I was forced to the conclusion that the secret lay in the fact that they could give to the economic and industrial phase of social life the central place it actually occupies in present life. In that fact lies the great advantage the Revolution has conferred upon educational reformers in Russia, in comparison with those in the rest

of the world. I do not see how any honest educational reformer in western countries can deny that the greatest practical obstacle in the way of introducing into schools that connection with social life which he regards as desirable is the great part played by personal competition and desire for private profit in our economic life. This fact almost makes it necessary that in important respects school activities should be protected from social contacts and connections, instead of being organized to create them. The Russian educational situation is enough to convert one to the idea that only in a society based upon the cooperative principle can the ideals of educational reformers be adequately carried into operation.

The central place of economic connections in the dovetailing of school work with social life outside the school is explicitly stated in the official documents of Commissar Lunacharsky. He writes: "The two chief present problems of social education are: (1) The development of public economy with reference to Socialist reconstruction in general and the efficiency of labor in particular; (2) the development of the population in the spirit of communism." The aims of education are set forth as follows: "(1) The union of general culture with efficiency of labor and power to share in public life; (2) supply of the actual needs of national economy by preparation of workers in different branches and categories of qualifications; (3) meeting the need of different localities and different kinds of workers."

Like all formal statements, these propositions have to be understood in the light of the practices by which they are carried into effect. So interpreted, the fact that among the aims the "union of general culture with efficiency of

labor" precedes that of supply of special needs through preparation of workers assumes a significance that might not otherwise be apparent. For perhaps the striking thing in the system is that it is not vocational, in the narrow sense those words often have with us, namely, the technical training of specialized workers. On the contrary, such training is everywhere postponed and subordinated to the requirements of general culture, which is, however, itself conceived of in a socially industrial sense; that is to say, as discovery and development of the capacities that enable an individual to carry on in a cooperative way, work that is socially useful. "socially useful" being conceived in the generous sense of whatever makes human life fuller and richer. Perhaps the easiest way to grasp the spirit of the industrial connections of school work with general social activities is to take the utterances of our own Manufacturers'

Association on the same topic and then reverse them. Preparation for special occupations is deferred to the stage of special schools called Technicums, which can be entered only after seven years of the public "unified" school have been completed. These schools are called "polytechnic," but the word is a misleading one in its ordinary English associations. For with us it signifies a school in which individual pupils can select and pursue any one of a considerable number of technologies, while in the Russian system it signifies a school in which pupils, instead of receiving a "mono-technical" training, are instructed in the matters which are fundamental to a number of special industrial techniques. In other words, even in the definitely vocational schools, specialized training for a particular calling is postponed until the latest years, after a general technological and scientific-social foundation has been laid.

As far as could be determined, there are two causes for the adoption of this broad conception of industrial education, in identification with the general culture appropriate to a coöperatively conducted society. One is the state of progressive educational theory in other countries, especially in the United States, during the early formative years after the Revolution. For a leading principle of this advanced doctrine was that participation in productive work is the chief stimulus and guide to self-educative activity on the part of pupils, since such productive work is both in accord with the natural or psychological process of learning; and also provides the most direct road to connecting the school with social life, because of the part played by occupations in the latter. Some of the liberal Russian educators were carrying on private experimental schools on this basis before the Revolution; the doctrine had the

prestige of being the most advanced among educational philosophies, and it answered to immediate Russian necessities.

Thus from an early period the idea of the "school of work" (Arbeit-schule, école du travail, escuela d'acción) was quite central in post-revolutionary school undertakings. And a main feature of this doctrine was that, while productive work is educative par excellence, it must be taken in a broad social sense, and as a means of creating a social new order and not simply as an accommodation to the existing economic régime.

This factor, however, accounts only for the earlier period of the growth of Soviet education, say, up to 1922 or 1923, a period when American influence, along with that of Tolstoy, was upon the whole predominant. Then there came in a reaction, from a Marxian standpoint.

The reaction, however, did not take the form of discarding the notion of productive work as central in schools. It only gave the idea a definitely socialistic form by interpreting the idea of work on the basis of the new estate of the worker brought about by the proletarian revolution. The change was a more or less gradual one, and even now there is hardly a complete transition or fusion. But the spirit of the change is well indicated in the words of one of the leaders of educational thought: "A school is a true school of work in the degree in which it prepares the students to appreciate and share in the ideology of the workers-whether country or city." And by the worker is here meant, of course, the worker made conscious of his position and function by means of the Revolution. This transformation of the earlier "bourgeois reforming idea" through emphasis upon the ideology of the labor movement thus

continued and reinforced the earlier emphasis upon the general idea of the connection of the school with industry.

This report is necessarily confined to a statement of general principles: the skeleton would gain flesh and blood if space permitted an account of the multifarious threads by which the connection between the schools and cooperatively organized society is maintained. In lieu of this account I can only pay my tribute to the liberating effect of active participation in social life upon the attitude of students. Those whom I met had a vitality and a kind of confidence in life—not to be confused with mere self-confidence-that afforded one of the most stimulating experiences of my life. Their spirit was well reflected in the inscription which a boy of fourteen wrote upon the back of a painting he presented me with. He was in one of the schools in which the idea just set forth is most completely and intelligently carried out, and he wrote that the picture was given in memory of the "school that opened my eyes." All that I had ever, on theoretical grounds, believed as to the extent to which the dull and dispirited attitude of the average school is due to isolation of school from life was more than confirmed by what I saw of the opposite in Russian schools.

There are three or four special points that call for notice in the identification established between cultural and industrial education. One of them is suggested by the official statement regarding the meeting by the schools of local conditions and needs. Soviet education has not made the mistake of confusing unity of education with uniformity: on the contrary, centralization is limited to the matter of ultimate aim and spirit, while in detail diversification is permitted, or rather encouraged. Each

province has its own experimental school, that supplements the work of the central or federal experimental stations, by studying local resources, materials and problems with a view to adapting school work to them. The primary principle of method officially laid down is that, in every topic, work by pupils is to begin with observation of their own environment, natural and social. (The best museum of natural and social materials for pedagogical purposes I have ever seen is in a country district outside of Leningrad, constructed on the basis of a complete exhibit of local fauna, flora, mineralogy, etc., and local antiquities and history, made by pupils' excursions under the direction of their teachers.)

This principle of making connections with social life on the basis of starting from the immediate environment is exemplified on its broadest scale in the educational work done with the minority populations of Russia-of which there are some fifty different nationalities. The idea of cultural autonomy that underlies political federation is made a reality in the schools. Before the Revolution, many, most of them had no schools, and a considerable number of them not even a written language. In about ten years, through enlisting the efforts of anthropologists and linguistic scholars—in which branch of science Russia has always been strong-all the different languages have been reduced to written form, textbooks in the local language provided, each adapted to local environment and industrial habits, and at least the beginnings of a school system introduced. Aside from immediate educational results, one is impressed with the idea that the scrupulous regard for cultural independence characteristic of the Soviet régime is one of the chief causes of its stability, in view

of the non-communist beliefs of most of these populations. Going a little further, one may say that the freedom from race- and colorprejudice characteristic of the régime is one of the greatest assets in Bolshevist propaganda among Asiatic peoples. The most effective way to counteract the influence of that propaganda would be for western nations to abandon their superiority-complex in dealing with Asiatic populations, and thereby deprive Bolshevism of its contention that capitalism, imperialistic exploitation and race prejudice are so inseparably conjoined that the sole relief of native peoples from them lies in adoption of communism under Russian auspices.

The central place of human labor in the educational scheme is made manifest in the plan for the selection and organization of subject-matter, or the studies of the curriculum.

This principle is officially designated the "complex system." Details appropriately belong in a special educational journal, but in general the system means, on the negative side, the abandonment of splitting up subject-matter into isolated "studies," such as form the program in the conventional school, and finding the matter of study in some total phase of human life-including nature in the relations it sustains to the life of man in society. Employing the words of the official statement: "At the basis of the whole program is found the study of human work and its organization: the point of departure is the study of this work as found in its local manifestations." Observations of the latter are, however, to be developed by "recourse to the experience of humanitythat is, books, so that the local phenomena may. be connected with national and international industrial life."

It is worthy of note that, in order to carry out this conception of the proper subject-matter of study, it is necessary for the teachers themselves to become students, for they must conceive of the traditional subject-matter from a new point of view. They are compelled, in order to be successful, both to study their local environment and to become familiar with the detailed economic plans of the central government. For example, the greatest importance is attached in the educational scheme to natural science and what we call nature-study. But according to the ruling principle, this material must not be treated as so much isolated stuff to be learned by itself, but be considered in the ways in which it actually enters into human life by means of utilization of natural resources and energies in industry for social purposes. Aside from the vitalization of physical knowledge supplied by thus putting it in its human context, this method of presentation compels teachers to be cognizant of the Gosplan—that is, the detailed projects, looking ahead over a series of years, of the government for the economic development of the country. An educator from a bourgeois country may well envy the added dignity that comes to the function of the teacher when he is taken into partnership in plans for the social development of his country. Such an one can hardly avoid asking himself whether this partnership is possible only in a country where industry is a public function rather than a private undertaking; he may not find any sure answer to the question, but the continued presence of the query in his mind will surely serve as an eye-opening stimulus.

In American literature regarding Soviet education, "the complex system" is often identified with the "project method" as that has developed in our own country. In so far as both procedures get away from starting with fixed lessons in isolated studies, and substitute for them an endeavor to bring students through their own activity into contact with some relatively total slice of life or nature, there is ground for the identification. By and large, however, it is misleading, and for two reasons. In the first place, the complex method involves a unified intellectual scheme of organization: it centers, as already noted, about the study of human work in its connection on one side with natural materials and energies, and on the other side with social and political history and institutions. From this intellectual background, it results that, while Russian educators acknowledge here—as in many other things—an original indebtedness to American theory, they criticize many of the "projects" employed in our schools as casual and as trivial, because they do not belong to any general social aim, nor have definite social consequences in their train.

To them, an educative "project" is the means by which the principle of some "complex" or unified whole of social subject-matter is realized. Its criterion of value is its contribution to some "socially useful work." Actual projects vary according to special conditions, urban or rural, and particular needs and deficiencies of the local environment. In general, they include contributions to improvement of sanitation and hygienic conditions (in which respects there is an active campaign carried on, modelled largely upon American techniques), assisting in the campaign against illiteracy; reading newspapers and books to the illiterate; helping in clubs, excursions, etc., with younger children; assisting ignorant adults to understand the policies of local

Soviets so that they can take part in them intelligently; engaging in communist propaganda, and, on the industrial side, taking some part in a multitude of diverse activities calculated to improve economic conditions. In a rural school that was visited, for example, students carried on what in a conventional school would be the separate studies of botany and entomology by cultivating flowers, foodplants, fruits, etc., under experimental conditions, observing the relation to them of insects, noxious and helpful, and then making known the results to their parents and other farmers, distributing improved strains of seed, etc. In each case, the aim is that sooner or later the work shall terminate in some actual participation in the larger social life, if only by young children carrying flowers to an invalid or to their parents. In one of the city schools where this work has been longest carried on, I saw,

for example, interesting charts that showed the transformation of detailed hygienic and living conditions of the homes in a working men's quarter effected through a period of ten years by the boys and girls of the school.

A word regarding the system of administration and discipline of Soviet schools perhaps finds its natural place in this connection. During a certain period, the idea of freedom and student control tended to run riot. But apparently the idea of "auto-organization" (which is fundamental in the official scheme) has now been worked out in a positive form, so that, upon the whole, the excesses of the earlier period are obsolescent. The connection with what has just been said lies in the fact that as far as possible the organizations of pupils that are relied upon to achieve selfdiscipline are not created for the sake of school

"government," but grow out of the carrying on of some line of work needed in the school itself, or in the neighborhood. Here, too, while the idea of self-government developed in American schools was the originally stimulating factor, the ordinary American practice is criticized as involving too much imitation of adult political forms (instead of growing out of the students' own social relationships), and hence as being artificial and external. In view of the prevailing idea of other countries as to the total lack of freedom and total disregard of democratic methods in Bolshevist Russia, it is disconcerting, to say the least, to anyone who has shared in that belief, to find Russian school children much more democratically organized than are our own; and to note that they are receiving through the system of school administration a training that fits them, much more systematically than is attempted in our professedly democratic country, for later active participation in the self-direction of both local communities and industries.


Fairness demands that I should say in conclusion that the educational system so inadequately described exists at present qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Statistically considered, its realization is still highly restricted—although not surprisingly so when one considers both the external difficulties of war, famine, poverty, teachers trained in alien ideas and ideals, and the internal difficulties of initiating and developing an educational system on a new social basis. Indeed, considering these difficulties, one is rather amazed at the progress already made; for, while limited in actual range, the scheme is in no sense on paper. It is a going concern; a self-moving organism. While an American visitor may feel a certain patriotic pride in noting in how many respects

an initial impulse came from some progressive school in our own country, he is at once humiliated and stimulated to new endeavor to see how much more organically that idea is incorporated in the Russian system than in our own. Even if he does not agree with the assertion of communist educators that the progressive ideals of liberal educators can actually be carried out only in a country that is undergoing an economic revolution in the socialist direction, he will be forced into searchings of heart and mind that are needed and wholesome. In any case, if his experience is at all like mine, he will deeply regret those artificial barriers and that barricade of false reports that now isolates American teachers from that educational system in which our professed progressive democratic ideas are most completely embodied, and from which accordingly we might, if we would, learn much more than from

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the system of any other country. I understand now as I never did before the criticisms of some foreign visitors, especially from France, that condemn Soviet Russia for entering too ardently upon an "Americanization" of traditional European culture.





VI

THE GREAT EXPERIMENT AND THE FUTURE

To sum up one's impressions about Russia is of necessity to engage in speculations about its future. Even the belief that has inspired what I have hitherto written, namely, that the most significant aspect of the change in Russia is psychological and moral, rather than political, involves a look into an unrevealed future. While the belief is doubtless to be accounted for by contacts that were one-sided, with edu-

cational people, not with politicians and economists, still there is good authority for it. Lenin himself expressed the idea that with the accomplishment of the Revolution the Russian situation underwent a great transformation. Before it had taken place, it was Utopian, he said, to suppose that education and voluntary cooperation could achieve anything significant. The workers had first to seize power. But when they had the reins of government in their hands, there took place "a radical change in our point of view toward Socialism. It consists in this, that formerly the center of gravity had to be placed in the political struggle and the conquest of power. Now this center of gravity is displaced in the direction of pacific cultural work. I should be ready to say that it is now moving toward intellectual work, were it not for our international relations, and the necessity of defending our position in the international system. If we neglect that phase and confine ourselves to internal economic relations, the center of gravity of our work already consists in intellectual work." He went on to say that the cause of Socialism is now, economically speaking, identical with that of the promotion of coöperation, and added the significant words: "Complete coöperation is not possible without an intellectual revolution."

Further testimony to the same effect developed in an interview some of us had with Krupskaia, Lenin's widow, an official at the head of one branch of the government department of education, and naturally a person with great prestige. Considering her position, her conversation was strangely silent upon matters of school organization and administration; it was about incidents of a human sort that had occurred in her contact with children and women, incidents illustrative of their desire

for education and for new light and lifeevincing an interest on her part that was quite congruous with her distinctly maternal, almost housewifely type. But at the close she summed up the task of the present régime: Its purpose is, she said, to enable every human being to obtain personal cultivation. The economic and political revolution that had taken place was not the end: it was the means and basis of a cultural development still to be realized. It was a necessary means, because without economic freedom and equality, the full development of the possibilities of all individuals could not be achieved. But the economic change was for the sake of enabling every human being to share to the full in all the things that give value to human life.

Even in the economic situation the heart of the problem is now intellectual and educational. This is true in the narrower sense that the present industrial scheme and plan cannot possibly be carried through without preparation of skilled technicians in all lines, industrial and administrative. What Wells said about the world is peculiarly true of Russia; there is a race between education and catastrophe that is, industrial breakdown. It is also true in the fundamental sense that the plan cannot be carried through without change in the desires and beliefs of the masses. Indeed, it seems to me that the simplest and most helpful way to look at what is now going on in Russia, is to view it as an enormous psychological experiment in transforming the motives that inspire human conduct.

There are, of course, two points of view from which it is not a genuine experiment, since its issue is foredoomed. The fanatic of individual capitalistic business for private gain and the Marxian dogmatic fanatic both have the answer ready in advance. According to the first, the attempt is destined to failure; it is fated to produce, in the words of Mr. Hoover, an "economic vacuum"; according to the latter, the transformation from individualism to collectivism of action is the absolute and inevitable result of the working of laws that are as positively known to social "science" as, say, the law of gravitation to physical science. Not being an absolutist of either type, I find it more instructive to regard it as an experiment whose outcome is quite undetermined, but that is, just as an experiment, by all means the most interesting one going on upon our globe—though I am quite frank to say that for selfish reasons I prefer seeing it tried in Russia rather than in my own country.

Both beliefs in their dogmatic form have served a purpose. The first—the "individual-

istic" philosophy-has enabled men to put up with the evils of the present order of things. If this is as fixed as human nature, and if human nature is built upon the pattern of the present economic order, there is nothing to do but bear up as best we can. The Marxian philosophy gave men faith and courage to challenge this régime. But ignoring both of these dogmatic faiths, I should say that what there is in Russia is an experiment having two purposes. The first and more immediate aim is to see whether human beings can have such guarantees of security against want, illness, old-age, and for health, recreation, reasonable degree of material ease and comfort that they will not have to struggle for purely personal acquisition and accumulation, without, in short, being forced to undergo the strain of competitive struggle for personal profit. In its ulterior reaches, it is an experiment to discover whether

the familiar democratic ideals-familiar in words, at least-of liberty, equality and brotherhood will not be most completely realized in a social régime based on voluntary coöperation, on conjoint workers' control and management of industry, with an accompanying abolition of private property as a fixed institution—a somewhat different matter, of course, than the abolition of private possessions as such. The first aim is the distinctly economic one. But the farther idea is that when economic security for all is secured, and when workers control industry and politics, there will be the opportunity for all to participate freely and fully in a cultivated life. That a nation that strives for a private culture from which many are excluded by economic stress cannot be a cultivated nation was an idea frequently heard from the mouths of both educators and working people.

It was at this point that my own antecedent notions-or, if you will, prejudices, underwent their most complete reversal. I had the notion that socialistic communism was essentially a purely economic scheme. The notion was fostered by the almost exclusive attention paid by socialists in western countries to economic questions, and by the loudly self-proclaimed "economic materialism" of Marxian communists. I was, therefore, almost totally unprepared for what I actually found: namely, that, at least in the circles with which I came in contact (which, however, included some working men as well as educators), the development of "cultivation" and realization of the possibility of everyone's sharing in it, was the dominant note. It turned out, most astonishingly that only in "bourgeois" countries are Socialists mainly concerned with improving

the material conditions of the working classes. as if occupied with a kind of public as distinct from private philanthropy in raising wages, bettering housing conditions, reducing hours of labor, etc. Not, of course, that the present Russian régime is not also occupied with such matters, but that it is so definitely concerned with expanding and enlarging the actual content of life. Indeed, I could not but feel (though I can offer no convincing objective proof) that foreign visitors who have emphasized widespread poverty as a ground for predicting the downfall of the present régime are off the track. In the first place, poverty is so much the historic heritage of the masses that they are not especially conscious of the pinching of this particular shoe; and in the next place, there are large numbers, especially of the younger generation, who are so devoted to the human and moral ideal of making free

cultivation universal that they do not mind the pinch; they do not feel it as a sacrifice.

Perhaps I should have been prepared to find this attitude. That the movement in Russia is intrinsically religious was something I had often heard and that I supposed I understood and believed. But when face to face with actual conditions, I was forced to see that I had not understood it at all. And for this failure, there were two causes as far as I can make out—I am, of course, only confessing my own limitations. One was that, never having previously witnessed a widespread and moving religious reality, I had no way of knowing what it actually would be like. The other was that I associated the idea of Soviet Communism, as a religion, too much with intellectual theology, the body of Marxian dogmas, with its professed economic materialism, and too little with a moving human aspiration and devotion. As it is, I feel as if for the first time I might have some inkling of what may have been the moving spirit and force of primitive Christianity. I even hate to think of the time, that seems humanly inevitable, when this new faith will also have faded into the light of common day, and become conventional and stereotyped. I am quite prepared to hear that I exaggerate this phase of affairs; I am prepared to believe that, because of the unexpectedness of the impression, I have exaggerated its relative importance. But all such allowances being made, I still feel sure that no one can understand the present movement who fails to take into account this religious ardor. That men and women who profess "materialism" should in fact be ardent "idealists" is undoubtedly a paradox, but one that indicates that a living faith is more important than the symbols by which it tries to express itself. Intellectual

formulæ seem to be condemned to have about them something pathetically irrelevant; they are so largely affected by accidents of history. In any case, it is hard not to feel a certain envy for the intellectual and educational workers in Russia; not, indeed, for their material and economic status, but because a unified religious social faith brings with it such simplication and integration of life. "Intellectuals" in other countries have a task that is, if they are sincere, chiefly critical; those who have identified themselves in Russia with the new order have a task that is total and constructive. They are organic members of an organic going movement.

The sense of disparity between the Soviet official theology, the Marxian doctrines, and the living religious faith in human possibilities when released from warping economic conditions, remains. A similar disparity seems to

have attended all vital movements hitherto undertaken. They have had their intellectual formulations: but use of the latter has been to provide a protective shell for emotions. Any predictions about the Russian future has to take into account the contradiction and conflict between rigid dogmas on one side and an experimental spirit on the other. Which will win, it is impossible to say. But I cannot but suppose that the Russian people will, in the end, through a series of adaptations to actual conditions as they develop, build something new in the form of human association. That these will be communistic in the sense of the leaders of the revolution, I doubt; that they will be marked by a high degree of voluntary cooperation and by a high degree of social control of the accumulation and use of capital, seems to be probable. Symbols, however, have a great way of persisting and of adapting themselves to changes in fact, as the history of Christianity and democracy both show. So, unless there is some remarkable breach of continuity, it is likely that the outcome, whatever it may be in fact, will be called communism and will be taken as a realization of the creed of its initial authors.

Education affords, once more, the material for a striking illustration of the rôle of experiment in the future evolution of Soviet Russia. In a region something less than a hundred miles from Moscow, there is a district fairly typical of northern rural Russia, in which there is an educational colony under the direction of Schatzsky. This colony is the center of some fourteen schools scattered through a series of villages, which, taken together, constitute an extensive (and intensive) educational experiment station for working out materials and

methods for the Russian rural system. There is not in my knowledge anything comparable to it elsewhere in the world. As the summer colony was in operation, we had the satisfaction of visiting the station and also noting its effect on the villages that have come under its influence. A somewhat similar undertaking under Pistrak exists in Moscow to deal with the problems of urban workers. It was closed on account of the vacation period, and so my knowledge is less at first hand. But it is in active and successful operation. Then, as has been noted, each province has its own experimental station to deal with specifically local problems. These enterprises are under the government, having its sanction and authoritative prestige. There is also in existence a supreme scientific council having a pedagogical section. The duties of this Scientific Council are in general to form plans for the social and

economic development of Russia; the program, while flexible, looks ahead over a term of years and includes much detail based on researches that are continuously conducted. Of this undertaking, probably the first in the world to attempt scientific regulation of social growth, the pedagogical section is an organic member; its business is to sift and audit the results of the educational experiments that are carried on, and to give them a form in which they may be directly incorporated into the school system of the country. The fact that both Schatzsky and Pistrak are members of this Council ensures that conclusions reached in the experiment stations receive full attention.

This matter is referred to here rather than in the account of Soviet education to which it properly belongs, in order to suggest, through a concrete example, that, however rigid and dogmatic the Marxian symbols may be, actual practices are affected by an experimental factor that is flexible, vital, creative. In this connection it may be worth while to quote from Pistrak, the words being the more significant because he is a strict party member. cannot apply the same rules to every school condition; that procedure would be contrary to the essence of our school. It is indispensable to develop in teachers aptitude for pedagogical creation; without this, it will be impossible to create the new school. The notion that pedagogues are artisans rather than creators, seems to us incorrect. Every human being is more or less a creator, and while an individual in isolation may fail to find a creative solution of a problem, in collectivity we are all creators." No one would claim that this ideal of creation is as yet realized, but no one can come in contact with educational activities without feeling that this spirit marks the Russian school leaders

to an extent unknown in other countries. In my first article, before coming into any close contact with educational endeavor, I wrote of the feeling of vitality and liberation that was got from contact with the face of the Russian scene. The later educational contacts confirmed this surface impression, while they also left the feeling of being initiated into the definite movement by which the movement of liberation was intensified and directed.

I do not believe that any person's particular guess about the exact form of the outcome of the present Russian movement is of any importance; there are too many unknowns in the equation. If I venture in the direction of a prediction, it is only by way of calling attention to two movements already going on. The factor of greatest importance seems to me to be the growth of voluntary coöperative groups.

In the orthodox theory, these form a transition stage on the road to the predestined end of Marxian Communism. Just why the means should not also be the end, and the alleged transitory stage define the goal, is not clear to me. The place occupied by the peasant in Russian life, the necessity of consulting his interests and desires, however disagreeable that consultation is, the constant concessions made to him in spite of official preference for the factory city worker, strengthens belief in the probability of cooperative rather than a strictly communistic outcome. Side by side with this factor, though of less immediate practical force, I should place the experimental aspect of the educational system. There is, of course, an immense amount of indoctrination and propaganda in the schools. But if the existing tendency develops, it seems fairly safe to predict that in the end this indoctrination will be subordinate to the awakening of initiative and power of independent judgment, while coöperative mentality will be evolved. It seems impossible that an education intellectually free will not militate against a servile acceptance of dogma as dogma. One hears all the time about the dialectic movement by means of which a movement contradicts itself in the end. I think the schools are a "dialectic" factor in the evolution of Russian communism.

These remarks do not detract from the significance of the Russian revolutionary movement; rather they add, in my mind, to it, and to the need for study of it by the rest of the world. And it cannot be studied without actual contact. The notion that a sixth of the world can be permanently isolated and "quarantined" is absurd enough, though the consequences of acting upon the absurdity are more likely to be tragic than humorous. But it is

even more absurd to suppose that a living idea that has laid hold of a population with the force and quality of a religion can be pushed to one side and ignored. The attempt, if persisted in, will result in an intensification of its destructive features and in failure to derive the advantages that might accrue from knowledge of its constructive features. Political recognition of Russia on the part of the United States would not go far in bringing about the kind of relations that are in the interest of both countries and of the world, but it is at least a necessary antecedent step. I went to Russia with no conviction on that subject except that recognition was in line with our better political traditions. I came away with the feeling that the maintenance of barriers that prevent intercourse, knowledge and understanding is close to a crime against humanity.

The phase of Bolshevism with which one


cannot feel sympathy is its emphasis upon the necessity of class war and of world revolution by violence. These features of Soviet Russia tend to recede into the background because of the pressure the authorities are under to do a vastly difficult constructive work in Russia itself. But the spirit that produces them is fed by the belief that the rest of the world are enemies of Soviet Russia: that it must be constantly on the defensive and that the best defense is aggressive attack. I do not think that free intercourse with the rest of the world would cause an immediate disappearance of the idea of stirring up civil war in capitalistic countries. But I am confident that such intercourse would gradually deprive the flame of its fuel and that it would die down. One derives the impression that the Third International is Russia's own worst enemy, doing harm to it by alienating other peoples' sympathy. Its

chief asset, however, is non-recognition. The withdrawal of recognition by Great Britain has done more than any other one thing to stimulate the extremists and fanatics of the Bolshevist faith, and to encourage militarism and hatred of bourgeois nations.

I cannot conclude without mentioning one point that is not strictly connected with the remainder of this summary. In times of peace the Third International does, as I have said, more injury to Russia than to other countries. But if there is a European war, it will, I believe, spring to life as a reality in every European nation. I left Russia with a stronger feeling than I had ever had before of the criminal ineptitude of those statesmen who still play with the forces that generate wars. There is one prediction to which I am willing to commit myself. If there is another European war,

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under present conditions, civil war will add to the horrors of foreign war in every continental country, and every capital in Europe will be a shambles in which the worst horrors of the days of revolution will be outdone.



MEXICO, 1926

CHURCH AND STATE IN MEXICO

THE events constituting the conflict of church and government in Mexico have been so fully reported in the press that there is little which a newcomer on the ground, like myself, can add. Politics and religion are the two subjects, in any case, which one cannot help approaching with a certain amount of parti pris. In this particular case one can receive about as many diverse accounts of the motives which explain the conduct of either side, and as many different prognostications as to the future, as the number of persons with whom. one converses. However, there has gradually formed in my mind a certain deposit of impressions regarding the present situation and its probable movement, which I shall expose, with

the understanding that it is simply a matter of certain net results which have emerged from the confusion and conflict of opinions, and not a claim to reveal any inner truths or hidden facts.

In the first place, the technical cause of the strike of the church is of greater importance than has been attached to it in most of the accounts which I have run across in the papers of the United States. On July 3, 1926, President Calles issued a series of regulations, giving effect, via the penal code, to the provisions of the constitution of 1917. Most of these rules were not only restatements, verbally exact, of the terms of the constitution, but they also related to accomplished facts, adding only definite penalties for cases of violation. Such accomplished facts included the dissolution of monastic orders; the denial of the right of incorporation or legal "personality" to religious bodies; the exclusion of all foreigners from the

right to exercise religious functions and to teach religion in schools; the title in the state, of all properties of religious bodies (churches and objects of art, jewels, etc., in them, as well as real estate); the limitation of all religious services to the interior of churches; the denial of the right to wear a distinctive religious garb or emblems outside of churches; the denial to the clergy of the right to engage in politics, to comment on political affairs (also denied to religious periodicals), and the complete laicizing of *primary* education, whether in public or private schools.

This legislation, embodied as already stated in the organic law of Carranaza's time which put in legal form the achievements of the revolution, and itself consummated the revolution of Juárez in 1857, is obviously drastic and thorough. Equally obvious to the eye of one acquainted with history, the constitution

marked a stadium in the struggle of church and state which has been going on for several centuries in all modern nations, and which has ended in all European states in the definite subordination of the church to civil authority. What is distinctive in the Mexican laws is the extreme thoroughness with which anti-clerical legislation has been carried out. Upon this legislation itself I do not propose to comment; one's attitude toward it will depend upon one's social and political philosophy, and one's view of the nature of religion, and its connection with organized political life. The usual defense of its unusually drastic character, as compared with that of even most other anticlerical legislation, is of course the monopolistic character of the past history of the church, its almost universal association with anti-republican tendencies, and the hold of the priests upon the ignorant rural Indian population, by

which was directed its intellectual, political and economic as well as its religious activity, without any corresponding contribution to education or well-being. To this has to be added, the distinct anti-foreign phase of the nationalistic side of the revolution; the claim is made that the exploitation of the natives by the clergy, economic and political, has been greatly increased and exasperated by the presence of foreign bishops and priests, especially Spanish and Italian. This fact, or alleged fact, has a bearing, as will be indicated shortly, upon the rules and penalties which are the immediate cause of the present clerical strike.

The constitution also contained a provision, which had not however been put into effect, that all priests and preachers should register, stating the particular church building with which their ministrations were connected, and that the registration should be vouched for by

ten citizens of the locality. The regulations of July 3 set August 1 as the date by which this registration should be accomplished, assigning heavy penalties for clergy who should officiate after that date without having registered. Technically the abandonment by the clergy of all religious rites and offices, including preaching and the sacraments, turns upon this one regulation. The clergy were forbidden from above to register; and, as the method by which they would then be protected from civil penalties for failure to register, were authorized to suspend all offices.

When one inquires into the reasons and motives for this attitude on the part of the archbishops, one plunges into the arena of rumor, not to say gossip. The reason officially assigned is that this move, coming after all the other restrictions put upon the church, was of so definitely an anti-religious nature as to

render it impossible for the church to exercise its God-given functions; that the regulations in their totality were contrary to divine and "natural" law, and hence null. Rumors of an extreme character are to the effect that it was hoped to create the impression that the state had itself closed the churches, thereby arousing a popular reaction which would weaken if not overthrow the government; the more moderate theory is that it was intended to create a popular reaction which would demand and secure from the federal congress and the state legislative bodies an amendment of the constitution. If the first expectation was entertained events have definitely negated it; upon this score, the government has won a complete victory; barring a few sporadic incidents complete order has been obtained, and the position of the government of President Calles was never stronger, perhaps never so strong. The more moderate expectation takes us into the region of prophecy; I can only register my impression that it is extremely unlikely to be fulfilled.

The position of the government is simple. The provision for registration is in the constitution; hence the resistance of the clergy is but another manifestation that the church still regards itself as superior to civil law. The registration is held to be a necessary consequence of the nationalization of ecclesiastical properties. Granted this premise, the state must know who is responsible for the care and preservation of the buildings and their treasures. Furthermore such registration is the only means by which clergy of foreign birth can be prevented from returning and resuming their activities. My own guess is this anti-foreign bias, so marked in all revolutionary "backward" countries, is the factor which counts most. On the surface there is now a complete deadlock;

there are rumors of an adjustment already on foot, but they spread one day to be denied the next. To one accustomed to the legalistic procedures of the Anglo-Saxon world, it seems as if the issue could be settled and church offices resumed only by a complete surrender on one side or the other. But here in Mexico some acquainted with the native psychology say that it will be settled rather by a gradual filtration of parish priests. There are already a few cases of individual submission to the law.

There has been a schismatic movement to form a Mexican Catholic church in contradistinction to the Roman Catholic church. So far it is largely abortive. But state control of church properties gives the government some leverage. The church cannot educate the people to do without its services; there are some good reasons for thinking that the pressure of the mass of the faithful will be directed

toward ensuring the resumption of the services of the church rather than toward any change of the constitution. There is no organized public opinion in Mexico; and personal opinion as to the attitude of the mass of inert and ignorant peasants varies with the attitude of the one who gives the judgment. But the church can hardly escape paying the penalty for the continued ignorance and lack of initiative which it has tolerated if not cultivated. In short, such popular organization as exists is with the government and not with the church; and this fact, as far as it goes, is the sole basis for predicting the future.

The regulations in question were issued by the President. This fact is eloquent as to political conditions. Congress even when in session does not make the important laws. It authorizes the President to issue what are in effect decrees putting the constitution into effect in this and that respect. Mexico is a republic, but effective democratic government is largely in the future. There is something humorous in the attitude of those, among whom are many foreigners including American fellow-countrymen, who sigh for the "strongman" government of Diaz. There is a strongman government in existence, but it operates mostly against foreign interests instead of in their behalf, as was the case with Diaz. The only well-organized force in the country, outside of the army, is the labor unions, and they are officially behind the government; the demonstration and parade of August 1 proved that fact. The power of the army in politics has been much curbed, and even if there were generals willing to advance their own prospects by rebelling against the government, which is the usual method of starting revolutions, they are, by common consent, practically powerless as long as the embargo of the United States against arms remains in force.

But in my opinion "liberals" in other countries can hardly appeal to existing democratic liberalism in Mexico in support of the policy of the government. The fact of the case is that the revolution in Mexico is not completed. There is not a single manifesto which does not refer to the Principles of the Revolution; it is from the standpoint of completing the revolution that events in Mexico must be judged, not from that of legalities and methods of countries where political and social institutions are stabilized. This fact accounts for the great diversity of judgment on the present crisis which one finds among intelligent people. If upon the whole they think the revolution is a good thing for Mexico, they support the government's side though regretting the harshness with which some of its measures have been executed. If they dislike the revolution, they are quite sure that the present struggle originated from anti-religious rather than political motives. Under these circumstances, one with only a short and superficial acquaintance with Mexican conditions is perhaps entitled to fall back on general historical knowledge, and see in the conflict a belated chapter in the secular struggle of church and state for superior political authority, complicated, as it has so often been in the past, with anti-foreign sentiment. From this standpoint, one may also prophesy on general historic grounds, not on the basis of knowledge of local conditions, what the outcome will be, the victory of the national state. Again, following history, the conclusion would be that Catholics as a whole will in the end, though the end may be remote in Mexico, be better off than when they had too easy and too monopolistic a possession of the field.

II

MEXICO'S EDUCATIONAL RENAISSANCE

Mexicans interested in education are given to calling attention to the fact that President Calles began his career as a rural school teacher. In one of his earlier political announcements he summed up his program in two policies: economic liberation and the development of public education. Most foreign residents are perforce familiar with the operations of the first factor in the program—which they usually call Bolshevism; not many have taken the trouble to acquaint themselves with the second.

At the outset, we may dispose of the formal features of the situation. The schools are of three categories: federal, state and municipal. The latter are decreasing, being taken over by the states, while federal activity is growing

more rapidly than state; moreover, the figures regarding the latter are well kept and accessible, while statistics for state schools are often not organized, nor easily attainable. Elementary education covers six years, of which the first four are, legally, compulsory. Actually about four children out of ten of the school population are in public schools. There are no statistics for private schools, but, before the closing of the Catholic institutions it is a fair guess that about one-half of the children were in some school.

In the federal district, the government is spending four times as much as was spent in the heyday of the Diaz régime; in some of the larger towns, there are not as yet, owing to the destructions of the revolutionary period, as many state and municipal schools as in 1910. Five open-air schools have been started in Mexico City and suburbs during the present

year, where 800 to 1,000 children are cared for at an expense for the plant of from ten to twenty thousand dollars. This type of school, the creation of the present school administration, under Doctor Puig, is artistic, hygienic and well adapted to the climate, and the low expense will make possible the provision of accommodation for all children of required school age in the federal district in a short time.

Until recently there was no secondary education in Mexico excepting the schools which prepared for the university; four high schools have been opened recently and are crowded. There is also a federal normal school, housed and equipped in a way equal to any in the world, with five thousand pupils of both sexes, including children in the practice school. A regional normal school for each state is planned. The flourishing National University

^{1 1926.}

has ten thousand students, a large number being women; its rector, Doctor Pruneda, is much interested in exchange of students and teachers, and during a visit to the United States in the coming autumn will arrange for such exchanges with our own country, a consummation which is to be hoped for. As it is, the University maintains, under the direction of Doctor Montaño, a truly unique summer school for North Americans (one learns in a Spanish-American country to temper the arrogance of our ordinary "American"), attended during the past summer by more than three hundred persons, mainly teachers, from the United States.

The most interesting as well as the most important educational development is, however, the rural schools: which means, of course, those for native Indians. This is the cherished preoccupation of the present régime; it signifies

a revolution rather than renaissance. It is not only a revolution for Mexico, but in some respects one of the most important social experiments undertaken anywhere in the world. For it marks a deliberate and systematic attempt to incorporate in the social body the Indians who form 80 percent of the total population. Previous to the revolution, this numerically preponderant element was not only neglected, but despised. Those who attack the revolution complacently ignore the fact that it was the inevitable outcome of this policy of contemptuous disregard for the mass of the people, a disregard which affected every phase of life: educational, for example, since the Diaz administration did not establish a single rural school for Indians. In spite of the difficulty in securing teachers, there are now 2,600 such schools, 1,000 of which were opened during the last year, which it is hoped to raise

to 2,000 during the coming year. It is estimated that if ten years of tranquillity are secured, there will be schools for the entire school population, and illiteracy, as far as the new generation is concerned, will be wiped out.

This educational revolution not only represents an effort to incorporate the indigenous population into the social life and intellectual culture of Mexico as a whole, but it is also an indispensable means of political integration for the country. Nothing in Mexico can be understood without bearing in mind that until a few years ago the Indians were economically enslaved, intellectually disinherited and politically eliminated. Even the present church-state crisis roots, at many points, in this fact. Because of the absence of rural schools, the only common force which touched the life of all the people was the church; and it is putting it moderately to say that the influence of the clergy did not make for social and political integration. The fact that the country priests have used their enormous influence over the souls of their parishes to oppose the establishment of rural schools has been at least one factor in causing the drastic decree for the laicizing of all primary schools.

The difficulties in creating a moral and political entity out of Mexico are so enormous that they often seem insuperable; one most readily pictures the general state of the country by thinking of early colonial days in the United States, with a comparatively small number of settlements of a high civilization surrounded by Indian peoples with whom they have but superficial contact. The fact that the Mexican Indians have a settled agricultural life, a much higher culture and greater resistance than our own Indians but increases the

difficulty of the situation. Add to this fact that the Indians are anything but homogeneous among themselves, divided into some thirty different tribes, intensely self-centered, jealous of their autonomy, prizing an isolation which is accentuated by geographical conditions, and we begin to have a faint idea of the problem which the revolutionary government is facing as systematically as all previous régimes dodged it. It is evidence of the still superficial character of our democratic ideas that the average foreign resident in Mexico, including those from the United States, assumes that the problem is incapable of solution, and that the only way out is "strong" oligarchical rule. One might think that the gallant attempt of the revolutionary government would win recognition if but for its gallantry, even from those who think the cause is doomed, but the sporting instinct of the average Anglo-Saxon (happily there are exceptions) appears to be as specialized as is his democratic creed.

Much more interesting than statistics are the spirit and aims which animate these rural schools. Mr. Saenz, the first sub-secretary of education (who once taught in the Lincoln School in New York), stated in a lecture recently at the University of Chicago that "nowhere have I seen better examples of a socialized school than in some of these rural schools in Mexico." I am willing to go further and say that there is no educational movement in the world which exhibits more of the spirit of intimate union of school activities with those of the community than is found in this Mexican development. I have long had a pet idea that "backward" countries have a great chance educationally; that when they once start in the school-road they are less hampered by tradition and institutionalism than are

countries where schools are held by customs which have hardened through the years. But I have to confess that I have never found much evidence in support of this belief that new countries, educationally new, can start afresh, with the most enlightened theories and practices of the most educationally advanced countries. The spirit and aims of Indian rural schools as well as of the Normal School of Mexico revived my faith.

Much of the actual work is, it goes without saying, crude, as crude as are the conditions under which it is done. But it is the crudeness of vitality, of growth, not of smug conventions. Whether or not it is the uprooting effect of long-continued revolutions I do not know; but along with the bad effects of so many and so rapid social dislocations, there is evident everywhere a marked spirit of experimentation, a willingness "to try anything once," and most

things more than once. Given the good start which now exists, the great need is continuity of policy, and it is seriously to be hoped that changes of political administration will not lead to abrupt shifts of educational plan.

Neither as to buildings, course of study nor preparation of teachers has the mistake of overelaborateness been made. Of the thousand federal rural schools opened during the last year almost every one was furnished without cost to the nation by the people of the locality, mainly by the parents who wanted their children to have the opportunities at present denied them. To judge from those which I saw in the state of Tlaxcala, they are mainly old buildings, sometimes churches, sometimes houses, which had been ruined and were restored for school use. In an Indian village not far from Mexico City, the six grades were housed in six different adobe dwelling-houses offered by the parents in lieu of any available building. Every school has a garden attached, and it is characteristic of the æsthetic temperament of the Indian that although the vegetable section may be neglected, the flower garden is sure to be gay and well cared for.

The simplicity of the buildings and the genial climate make for a simple curriculum: reading, writing and, when necessary, the speaking of Spanish as a matter of course; some "figuring," local geography, national history with emphasis upon the heroes of Independence and the Revolution, and then for the remainder, industrial education, chiefly agricultural, and such home industries, weaving, pottery, etc., as are characteristic of the neighborhood. (It is part of the general "socialistic" policy of the present government to foster the development of "small industries," carried on in the home, and cooperatively

managed, as an offset to the invasion of large, capitalistic and therefore for the most part foreign industries.) In many places there is much attention to music and to design in the plastic arts, for both of which things the Indians display a marked genius. As a rule, if what we saw may be depended upon as evidence, the designs in the small rural schools were much better, even though the work was crude, than in the industrial schools of the city, where department store art has made a lamentable invasion. If the rural schools can succeed in preserving the native arts, æsthetic traditions and patterns, protecting them from the influence of machine-made industry, they will in that respect alone render a great service to civilization. Fortunately the influence of Vasconcelos, the former minister of education, and of Doctor Gamio, the distinguished anthropologist, was strongly employed for the maintenance of the indigenous arts and crafts. At the present time the National University has a woman, herself a cultivated musician, constantly occupied in traveling throughout the country collecting the folk-songs, words and music, in which Mexico is rich almost without parallel in contemporary countries.

As for instruction, the leading idea is that any teacher is better than none, provided there is a native man or woman who can read and write and is devoted. For the most part, they receive their professional instruction after they begin teaching. One of the most interesting features of teacher training is the "cultural missions." The "missionaries" (this is their title) go to some country town, gather the rural teachers of the immediate district, and for three weeks the staff gives intensive instruction. The work is not theoretical pedagogy. There is always an instructor in physical training

(almost every school in Mexico, no matter how remote, now has a playground and a basketball field). A social worker is present, usually a woman, who gives instruction in hygiene, first aid, vaccination, and the rudiments of the care of children, etc. There are also a teacher of chorus singing, a specialist in hand industries, instructed to employ as far as possible local materials, and finally, a specialist in school organization and methods of teaching. The task of the latter is, however, chiefly to coördinate the academic teaching of the schools with agricultural and manual industries.

During the last school year, the missionaries worked in six states and next year's budget carries an increase of half a million pesos for extension of the work. At the same time, the federal bureau is sending small libraries as fast as possible to all schools, and the aim is to make each one the center of a new life for its

neighborhood, intellectual, recreational and economic. Night schools are held in each building, to which come young men and women who are to work during the day; their eagerness to learn is symbolized in the fact that they walk miles to reach the place of instruction, each one bringing a candle by whose glimmering light the studying is done. And the Indian teachers work practically all day and then again in the evening for a wage of four pesos a day.

The ruling educational catch-word is escuela de acción. It is a common complaint that the graduates of the former schools have marvelous memories, but no initiative and little independent responsibility. This fact has been cited to me scores of times as a convincing indication of the limits of the mentality of the Mexican. I am skeptical in advance of all such psychological generalizations; as long as pupils were

dealing with traditional studies in the traditional way, the material was so isolated from their experience that memory was their sole reliance. Now that "activity"—not always to be sure with adequate organization or intellectual content—is the guiding principle, and the "project method" is all but officially adopted as the basis of the school program, there is sure to be a change. Practice falls short of ideals, and the program is much better executed in some places than in others. But I believe that the brightest spot in the Mexico of today is its educational activity. There is vitality, energy, sacrificial devotion, the desire to put into operation what is best approved in contemporary theory, and above all, the will to use whatever is at hand.

We in the United States who have pursued such a different policy with our Indian population are under an obligation to understand and

to sympathize. The policy of incorporating the Indians into modern life is of such extraordinary difficulty, its execution demands so much time, peace and tranquillity, that any action on our part which puts added obstacles in its way is simply criminal. One can sympathize with foreigners in Mexico who find that their legal rights are not assured; yet from the standpoint of business in the long run as well as from that of human development, vested legalities are secondary to the creation of an integrated people. Foreign interference in any and every form means immediate increased instability and this unsettlement means in turn the prolongation of those internal divisions which have been the curse of Mexico; it means a deliberate cultivation of all seeds of turbulence, confusion and chaos.

III

FROM A MEXICAN NOTEBOOK

It is possible that little things, things apparently insignificant, will count for more in the future of Mexico than sensational affairs which newspapers have headlined. During the early days of August, 1926, when excitement was at its height, the walls of Mexico blossomed out with posters, large and small, instructing the population to wash their hands before eating. They were issued by the bureau of propaganda of the Department of Public Health. They are one symptom among many of an intensive and systematic campaign to improve the physical and hygienic habits of the people. The rector of the University, himself a physician, lextures regularly to the inspectors of prima/ry schools in the federal district upon social bygiene. Home-visitors are already at work in

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connection with the schools, and the federal normal school has a two years' course to train these go-betweens whose duties are largely centered upon improving conditions of health. School medical inspection has been instituted. City schools are being provided with open-air swimming pools. Old residents say that one of the most striking changes is in the interest in outdoor sports. Before the revolution the common people were hardly permitted to enter Chapultepec Park, which is certainly one of the most beautiful of the world; now it has many children's playgrounds which are in constant use. During this autumn, Olympic games for Central America will be held in Mexico City.

An interesting manifestation of transitional movements is the growth of "new thought." There is in Mexico City a center of the Im-

personal Life. For the benefit of those as ignorant as I was, it may be said that the movement originated in a book with that title published in Akron, Ohio. Whether it reached Mexico along with automobile tires I do not know. But purely by means of a translation of which over twenty thousand copies have now been sold—it made its way, and there is now a center of the faith with four thousand adherents, holding two meetings a week. The members have come mostly from the educated classes, who have deserted the church, and have now filled the religious void with "new thought." My statement in answer to a question that I had never happened to hear of the book or the movement in the United States was received with obvious skepticism. The inquirer, himself a physician, was prepared to hear that I was the author of the book. The bookstores are filled with translations of different types of occult literature. Probably more copies of Orison Swett Marden than of any other American author are sold in Mexico—except Nick Carter. One of the two leading dailies of Mexico City recently published an article on North American culture in which after a reference to Emerson it was pointed out that Marden's is today *the* philosophy of the United States.

Mexico is the land of contradictions. This fact, so baffling that it keeps the visitor in an unrelieved state of foggy confusion, is at the same time the most natural of all its phenomena. The newest and the oldest exist side by side without mixing and also inextricably combined. The result is the Mexico of today; if I seek a single adjective by which to describe it, "incredible" is the word that comes to mind. Fifteen years ago farm labor was in a state of

complete serfdom, in fact a slavery as effective as that of Negroes in the United States before the Civil War. Industrial labor was unorganized and oppressed. Today Mexico has, on the statute books, the most advanced labor legislation of any contemporary state; and the "syndicates" are the greatest single power in the land. The streets blaze forth the signs of the offices of the different unions more prominently than in any place I have ever visited. Five years ago the marchers in a May Day procession in Mexico City could be counted in the hundreds; now they amount to fifty or sixty thousand.

Human life is cheap; men with full cartridge belts and revolvers are seen everywhere on the street and in trains. A few weeks ago several politicians were shot at crowded midday in the street which is Mexico's union of Broadway and Fifth Avenue. But any acci-

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dent in a mine must be reported at once to the government bureau in Mexico City, and if it is serious enough to result in any miners being taken to the hospital, word of it must be telegraphed. The coexistence of customs that antedate the coming of the Spaniards, that express early colonial institutions, and that mark the most radical of contemporary movements, intellectual and economic, accounts for the totally contradictory statements about every phase of Mexican life with which the visitor is flooded; it makes impossible any generalization except that regarding the combination of the most stiff-necked conservatism and the most unrestrained and radical experimentalism.

One of the picturesque elements of contemporary Mexican life is the religious life of the natives, where Catholic rites have been superimposed upon pre-conquest creeds and cults. A

resident in the state of Oaxaca told me of seeing an altar on the top of a mountain to the god of rain where, just before the coming of the rainy season, pilgrims poured the blood of turkeys upon the ground and offered the breasts on the altar. These same peasants pour an offering of soup upon the newly plowed grounds just before planting, and make a similar offering after the harvest is gathered. And Oaxaca is not the most primitive state of Mexico. A professor in the University in Mexico City tells of being invited to the opening of a rural school in the mountains not far from Mexico City. In response to inquiries, the mayor, an Indian, informed him that he was a socialist and was also taking part in the ceremony of the adoration of the Virgin which was going on. Asked for an explanation of the seeming anomaly, the village chief replied that he was a socialist because the government had

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made the village a pueblo—that is, granted it self-government—while he was adoring the Virgin because the charter arrived on the saint's day. A not dissimilar story concerns the revival of worship of the old god of rain after a drought, where the rites were terminated with the advice of the old idol to purchase a new robe for the Virgin in the parish church. Priests are nowhere as numerous as are churches, and in many remote districts the churches are in the charge of locally elected major-domos, who conduct services except during the annual or semi-annual visit of a priest.

Some of the most beautiful pottery of the country is made in an Indian village of a few thousand inhabitants about ten miles out of Guadalajara. The entire family works together in the industry, squatting on the ground for the shaping and painting; the methods are

those of centuries ago; not even a potter's wheel is used. The patterns, while not identical with the primitive, are genuinely indigenous, observing a traditional type with spontaneous individual inventions. The school authorities had the sense to remove formal instruction in drawing from the schools when they found the taught designs were being copied. But halfway between this town and Guadalajara there is another pottery center where the stores are filled—together with some specimens of Tonalá work—with all the monstrosities of commercialized European and North American "art." Unfortunately, but naturally, in the minds of the well-to-do, the native pottery with its extraordinarily beautiful rhythms of pattern and color is associated with the life of the peons; conspicuous consumption favors the use of artistic monstrosities. With the rise of the standard of living among the common people,

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it will be increasingly difficult to maintain the native arts. Fortunately enlightened educators, including the section of the federal department of education for indigenous culture, are working against the tide; whether with success remains to be determined.

Among the contradictions of Mexico is the union of anti-foreign, and anti-American, feeling with the disposition to imitate foreign things and methods, especially those of the United States. In some sense, the "Americanization" of the country appears to be an inevitable process, both for good and for evil. The Ford car and the movie are already working a revolution. English is practically the only foreign language taught in the schools, including even the national military school. The large emigration from Mexico into the United States is having a reflex effect. Increasing numbers

of Mexican youth are sent to the United States for their schooling. In regard to large classes of goods, those from the United States control the markets, even in remote districts, and pervasively affect the habits of the people.

The close contact of the most industrially advanced country of the world with an industrially backward country but one possessed of enormous natural resources, the contact of a people having an industrialized, Anglo-Saxon psychology with a people of Latin psychology (in so far as it is not pre-colonial) is charged with high explosives. But the most definite impression of the many confused and uncertain impressions I carry away is that slow permeation is so inevitable, under existing conditions of industry, commerce, travel and other means of distributing goods and ideas, that its great enemies are those who, impatient for immediate profit and judging affairs only from the standpoint of their own economic and legal psychology, would hasten the process. Their attitude and operations in the past are the chief cause of the deliberate efforts of the revolutionary government to handicap the economic invasion of the United States. Every activity on their part which looks even remotely and indirectly toward our intervention or even interference. only delays the natural process. It also increases, under the title of "stabilizing Mexican conditions," the inherent instability of the country. An ironical element of the situation is that those business interests which at home clamor for the free play of "natural" economic law and forces and which deplore governmental action, in Mexico distrust this factor and clamor for political and diplomatic action.

Finally, while one hears denunciation of the Mexican government from American business

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men, especially those engaged in mining and oil, what they say about Mexican "bolshevism" is mild in comparison with their language about the activity—or inactivity—of our own State Department. Judging from their attitude, those in our country who are interested in maintaining good relations between the two countries have more cause for gratitude to our own government than they are aware of.

IV

IMPERIALISM IS EASY

In common, I imagine, with large numbers of my fellow countrymen, I had long entertained in a vague way the notion that imperialism is a more or less consciously adopted policy. The idea was not clearly formulated, but at the back of my head was the supposition that nations are imperialistic because they want and choose to be, in view of advantages they think will result. A visit to Mexico, a country in which American imperialism is in the making, knocked that notion out of my head. The descent to this particular Avernus is unusually easy. Given, on one hand, a nation that has capital and technical skill, engineering and financial, to export, plus manufacturers in need of raw material, especially iron and oil, and,

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on the other hand, an industrially backward country with large natural resources and a government which is either inefficient or unstable. or both, and it does not require intention or desire to involve the first nation in imperialistic policies. Even widespread popular desire to the contrary is no serious obstacle. The natural movement of business enterprise, combined with Anglo-American legalistic notions of contracts and their sanctity, and the international custom which obtains as to the duty of a nation to protect the property of its nationals, suffices to bring about imperialistic undertakings.

Imperialism is a result, not a purpose or plan. It can be prevented only by regulating the conditions out of which it proceeds. And one of the things which most stands in the way of taking regulatory measures is precisely the consciousness on the part of the public that it

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is innocent of imperialistic desires. It feels aggrieved when it is accused of any such purpose, then resentful, and is confusedly hurried into dangerous antagonisms, before it perceives what is happening. The charge of imperialistic desires sounds strange even to the group of men who have created the situation in which they appeal to their home country for intervention. All they want, as they indignantly assert, is protection of life and property. If their own government cannot afford that protection, what is it good for anyway?

In Mexico, and presumably in other Latin-American states, conditions are exacerbated by the extended meaning which has been given the Monroe Doctrine. In this widened meaning it has become one of the chief causes of the growing imperialism of the United States. Investors and concession holders from European countries are estopped from appealing to their

own countries for intervention to give them protection. Pressure is consequently brought to bear upon the United States. Unless we act, we are a dog in a manger. We won't do anything ourselves, and we won't let anybody else do anything. Thus the United States has become a kind of trustee for the business interests of other countries. As one consequence, the animosity which might otherwise be distributed among a number of countries is consolidated, and then directed at the United States. About the most promising thing which could happen would be for our people to realize, with vividness, the Spanish-American view of the Monroe Doctrine. We still, for the most part, pat ourselves upon the back complacently for upholding it. We think of it as a benevolent measure for which all Central and South America is, or should be, grateful to us. We do not take into account the change

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of conditions in these states; their growth in power and national consciousness, which makes them resent being treated as infants under our tutelage. We are not aware of the change in conditions brought about by our development into a nation possessed of enormous capital seeking investment, a fact which makes the countries to the south much more afraid of us than they are of Europe. In consequence, the sacred doctrine has become entangled with all the forces which plunge us into imperialistic dangers.

The average citizen of the United States has little knowledge of the extent of American business and financial interests in Mexico. It does not occur to him that, from the standpoint of intelligent Mexicans, that country is, or was, in great danger of becoming an economic dependency of this country. As things went under the Diaz régime, the Mexicans might

have awakened some morning and found their natural resources, agricultural and grazing lands, mines and oil wells, mainly in the hands of foreigners, largely Americans, and managed for the profit of investors from foreign countries. I well remember how one indignant legal representative of American business concessionaires contrasted the present régime with that of Diaz. He said: "Diaz had a standing order that any complaint from any American citizen was to be settled the same day it was made." This was his naïve tribute to the Diaz administration. In contrast with it, the Calles régime naturally appears to Americans with investments as something unspeakable.

I would not say that it gives no cause for legal complaint; I would not say that it does not afford many an occasion for protest. From the Mexican standpoint, the government is fighting for control of its own country, as much

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as if it were at war, and too scrupulous a regard for legal technicalities might mean defeat. An unusually frank Mexican ex-official said to an American business man: "Of course, we have to handicap you by legislation and administration in every way we can. You are much abler and more experienced in business than we are; if we don't even up some other way, you will soon own the whole country." Such things indicate the ease with which the relations of an industrially advanced and a backward country ultimately drift into situations where the vested legal rights which have grown up are confronted by a vigorous national sentiment, and then can hardly be maintained without appeal for governmental intervention.

The ease with which imperialism follows economic exploitation is indicated by the almost unanimous sentiment of Americans resident in Mexico, including those who do not

concessions and who are not directly affected by the new laws. They would deny, and as far as their conscious intent is concerned, deny sincerely, for the most part, any imperialistic taint. What they want is simply "protection" for American rights. Judging from conversations, the objects of their dislike stand in about the following order: in the first rank, they are irritated with Americans having no business interests, who come down there for a few weeks, talk with plausible Mexicans, and, with the usual prejudice against "Wall Street," go away more or less pro-Mexican. Locally, such visitors would be gladly consigned to a lethal chamber. They are said to be completely ignorant, and yet they assume to know more about the right relations between Mexico and the United States than "we do who have lived here many years, and know the facts about the persecution of Americans and the disregard for their rights." President Wilson was not one of this class, but he succeeded in winning the equal dislike of American residents and of Mexicans, of the latter by his action, and of the former by his talk against concessionaires, a talk which "encouraged Mexican Bolshevism."

Next in order comes irritation with the American State Department, based on the fact that while "it is always writing notes, it never does anything." There is little doubt on the Mexican side of the line as to what "doing something" means. Super-patriots, on this side, may suppose that it signifies a show of force such as has taken place in Nicaragua. On the spot, they know that it means not only war and continued guerrilla strife, but taking control of the government, and managing Mexican affairs for a number of years. To be sure, there is the usual pious talk, also quite sincere as far as the consciousness of many Americans is concerned. We should, of course, set up a model of administration, multiply schools, and after we had shown the Mexicans how a state should be managed, should turn it over to them, in good running order. It is not difficult for the American who has been expatriated for a number of years to idealize the honesty and efficiency of our own government, in contrast with the corruption, inefficiency and, above all, instability, which have obtained in Mexico. The favorite idea, which is even shared, it is rumored, in diplomatic quarters, is that Great Britain and the United States shall unite in this benevolent undertaking. Was this in Mr. Hearst's mind when he made his recent touching appeal for closer coöperation between this country and Great Britain?

An American oil man, who knows his Mexico well, one of the adventurous type which is personally more attractive than the smug legal-

istic, told us that they did not ask for the support of the State Department; all they wanted was to be let alone. He said, as an indication of how well they could take care of themselves, that at one time all was in readiness for three independent states in Mexico, one including Vera Cruz, another Tampico, and a third the lands in the north, next to the American border, where immigrants from this side had settled. At Tampico, he said, 2,000 American workmen, engaged in the oil industry, were furnished with rifles. There was perhaps some romantic exaggeration in the tale, but there was also a residuum of fact. Of course, these revolutions were not to be undertaken by Americans, but by dissatisfied Mexicans. Unfortunately, the State Department said No.

Third in the order of dislike, as far as talk goes, comes the Calles government.

Below this state of mind, instances of which

might be given indefinitely, is the conflict between Anglo-American institutional psychology, especially with reference to charters, contracts and other legal points, and the Spanish-Latin temper. The two mix no better than oil and water, and unfortunately there is no great disposition to discover and use any emulgents. As usually happens with small colonies in a foreign country, the native "Anglo-Saxon" psychology stiffens up, instead of relaxing. The years of civil war, of chaos and destruction, which Mexico has gone through, make it easy for outsiders to maintain an attitude of superiority and aloofness. The supposed principle of international law by which it is the duty, rather than simply the right, of a nation to come to the protection of the rights of its nationals when they are disregarded, makes the conflict of interests and of traditions a serious menace to peace. Our constitutional system


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is an additional source of danger. Congress must be consulted before war can be declared. But the President is the Commander of the Army and Navy, and it is only too easy to create a situation after which the cry "stand by the President," and then "stand by the country," is overwhelming.

Public opinion has spoken with unusual force and promptitude against interference in Mexico. But the causes of the difficulty, the underlying forces which make for imperialistic ventures, are enduring. They will outlast peaceful escape from the present crisis, supposing we do escape. Public sentiment, to be permanently effective, must do more than protest. It must find expression in a permanent change of our habits. For at present, both economic conditions and political arrangements and traditions combine to make imperialism easy. How many American citizens are ready

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for an official restatement of the Monroe Doctrine? How many are willing to commit the country officially to the statement that American citizens who invest in backward foreign countries do so at their own risk?



THE TURKISH TRAGEDY

THE tragedy in Turkey is more extensive than the sad plight of minorities. Those who have the patience to refrain in the Near East from a premature partisanship are likely soon to arrive at a state of mind in which all parties are so much to blame that the question of assigning responsibility is at most one of quantities and proportions. But a deeper and fuller acquaintance with the sufferings of all these peoples brings with it a revulsion. One becomes disgusted with the whole affair of guilt. Pity for all populations, minority and majority alike, engulfs all other sentiments-except that of indignation against the foreign powers which have so unremittingly and so cruelly utilized the woes of their puppets for their own ends.

The situation in Turkey with respect to Turks, Armenians and Greeks alike meets all the terms of the classic definition of tragedy, the tragedy of fate. A curse has been laid upon all populations and all have moved forward blindly to suffer their doom.

It is a tragedy with only victims, not heroes, no matter how heroic individuals may have been. There are villains, but they are muffled figures appearing upon the open stage only for fleeting glimpses. They are the Great Powers, among which it is surely not invidious to select Russia and Great Britain by name. It is easy to become a fatalist in the presence of the history of Asia Minor and the Balkans; anyone who would write history in terms of Providence is well advised to keep clear of these territories.

We were in Brusa, the seat of the Ottoman power before the capture of Constantinople, one of the most beautiful and in natural prom-

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ise most prosperous of the cities of Anatolian Turkey. As we walked the streets we passed alternately by the closed shops and houses formerly kept by Greeks and Armenians who are now dead or deported in exchange for Turks in Greece, and by the ruins of buildings of the Turkish population burnt by the Greeks in their retreat. We saw business houses which had changd hands back and forth, the Greeks seizing the property of Turkish merchants and compelling the latter to flee the city when they were in power, and Turkish merchants in present possession of trades and commercial institutions formerly belonging to Greeks. There was a jumble with no outstanding fact except that of general suffering and ruin. It struck me as a symbol of the whole situation, only on a smaller scale and with less bloodshed and rapine than is found in most parts of the Anatolian territory.

The valley of "Green Brusa" was full of flourishing tobacco crops. Even they had a voice speaking indirectly of misery. A few years ago no tobacco was grown in this region. It was introduced by the Turks expelled from Macedonia now precariously occupied by the Greeks—precariously because Serbs and Bulgars both claim it in the name of nationalismwith Turks nourishing resentment in memory of their long and industrious residence from which they have been violently expelled. Thus the flourishing tobacco told the same tale as the declining silk-cocoon business, the latter languishing because it was the industry of Greeks now forced to remove. I know nothing which speaks more urgently of the common tragedy than the fact that the cruel exchange of populations by the half million, this uprooting of men, women and children transferring them to places where they do not want to go

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and where they are not wanted, has seemed to honest and kind persons the only hope for the avoidance of future atrocities.

Brusa serves also as a symbol of another phase of the situation. We passed through the Jewish quarter, and found the Jews still in possession of their homes and property, the more flourishing perhaps because of the total absence of their former commercial competitors, the Greeks and Armenians. Unbidden the thought comes to mind: Happy the minority which has had no Christian nation to protect it. And one recalls that the Jews took up their abode in "fanatic" Turkey when they were expelled from Europe, especially Spain, by saintly Christians, and they have lived here for some centuries in at least as much tranquillity and liberty as their fellow Turkish subjects, all being exposed alike to the rapacity of their common rulers. To one brought up, as most

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Americans have been, in the Gladstonian and foreign-missionary tradition, the condition of the Jews in Turkey is almost a mathematical demonstration that religious differences have had an influence in the tragedy of Turkey only as they were combined with aspirations for a political separation which every nation in the world would have treated as treasonable. One readily reaches the conclusion that the Jews in Turkey were fortunate that a Zionistic state had not been built up which should feel strong enough to intervene in Turkish politics and stimulate a separatist movement and political revolt. In contrast, the fate of the Greeks and Armenians, the tools of nationalistic and imperialistic ambitions of foreign powers, makes one realize how accursed has been the minority population that had the protection of a Christian foreign power.

Unfortunately the end is not yet, even
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with the completed exchange of populations, and the accompanying misery of peoples at least temporarily homeless, often unacquainted with the language of their home-kin, with thousands of orphans and beggared refugees, as numerous among the Turks as among the Armenians and Greeks, even if our Christian benevolence, still under the influence of foreign political propaganda, does not hear so much about or experience so much solicitude for Turkish woes. The end is not yet because, in the case of the Armenians at least, the great powers have not even yet become willing to refrain from experimenting at their expense. One can hardly blame the Greeks in their unsettled and unstable condition for asking that a considerable portion of the deported Armenians be again deported, this time from Greek soil. But what shall we say when we read that already at Geneva a plea has been made for

the creation of the Armenian "home" in Caucasian Turkey—a home that would require protection by some foreign power and be the prelude to new armed conflicts and ultimate atrocities? Few Americans who mourn, and justly, the miseries of the Armenians, are aware that till the rise of nationalistic ambitions, beginning with the seventies, the Armenians were the favored portion of the population of Turkey, or that in the Great War, they traitorously turned Turkish cities over to the Russian invader; that they boasted of having raised an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men to fight a civil war, and that they burned at least a hundred Turkish villages and exterminated their population. I do not mention these things by way of appraising or extenuating blame because the story of provocations and reprisals is as futile as it is endless; but it indicates what happened in the past to both

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Armenian and Turkish populations when the minority element was taken under the protecting care of a foreign Christian power, and what may recur if the Armenians should be organized into a buffer state. Nor is it likely to be better in "little Armenia," if the Armenians of Latin Catholic persuasion are deposited between the Turks to the north and Syria to the south, which was, according to newspaper reports, to be the French policy in connection with their mandated territory.

If human wit is baffled in seeking constructive measures which shall transform the tragic scene into one of happiness, history at least makes clear a negative lesson. Nothing but evil to all parties has come in the past or will come in the future from the attempts of foreign nations to utilize the national aspirations of minority populations in order to advance their own political interests, while they then conceal

and justify their villainous courses by appeal to religion. After all, the Turks are here; there is a wide territory in which they form an undisputed majority; for centuries the land has been their own; the sentiments have gathered about it that always attend long habitation. Whether we like it or not, other elements in the population must accommodate themselves to this dominant element, as surely as, say, immigrants in America have to adjust their political aspirations and nationalistic preferences to the fact of a unified national state. If a fiftieth of the energy, money and planning that has been given to fostering antagonisms among the populations had been given to searching out terms upon which the populations could live peaceably together without the disruption of Turkey, the situation today would be enormously better than it is. Whether the European great powers have learned the lesson

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that their protection and aid is a fatal and tragic gift, there is no way of knowing. But it is at least time that Americans ceased to be deceived by propaganda in behalf of policies which are now demonstrated to bring death and destruction impartially to all elements, and which are nauseating precisely in the degree that they are smeared over with sentiments alleged to be derived from religion. Finally, if suddenly, the Turks also have been converted to nationalism. The disease exists in a virulent form at just this moment. It will abate or be exacerbated in just the degree in which the Turkish nation is accepted in good faith as an accomplished fact by other nations, or in which the old tradition of intervention, intrigue and incitation persists. In the latter case, the bloody tragedy of Turkey and the Balkans will continue to unroll.

II

ANGORA, THE NEW

It is not only in Europe that there is bewilderment at the decision of the new rulers of Turkey to abandon the secular capital of historic empires, situated as if nature herself had destined it to be queen of empires, in order to found a new capital some hundreds of miles in the interior of Asia. Astonishment and resentment are felt also in Constantinople, perhaps more in Constantinople than elsewhere. In addition to the amazement attendant upon ceasing to be for the first time in almost fifteen centuries the mistress, spiritual and temporal, of a large part of the world, there is the disdain which the cultivated capital always feels for the rude province. That during a period of military stress and during a period of occupa-

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tion of Constantinople by foreign forces, the country should find the seat of its recuperation in the remote interior is understandable. But that when this period was finished, the new leaders should continue seriously to turn their backs on a city which with Rome and Peking is one of the great capitals of the world, is incredible.

The railway journey does not lessen the wonder. After passing through western Anatolia, a country beautiful and picturesque by turns, the train mounts the central great plateau. The region is like nothing more than some of our far western plateaus, modified by the foothills of the Rockies: treeless as far as the eye can reach; occasional herds of sheep and cattle; here and there grain fields which testify to a precarious "dry farming"; almost no houses, the occasional village, small and tucked away in a ravine in the side of some hill,

eroded as if to serve as a geological model for a class of students in physical geography. One tries to imagine an emergency which should cause the permanent removal of our seat of government from Washington to some frontier town in Wyoming—realizing, however, that the analogy hardly holds, since Washington is a parvenu compared with that city which has passed through the hands of many peoples, but has always remained the imperial city of the ruling nation or race of the time.

After only a few hours in Angora, the mood changes. Scenically it puts forth its own charm, different as it is from that union of sea, straits and varied hills that makes Constantinople unique. Its charm is more oriental; it speaks definitely the language of Asia without a European accent. The city sits on a hill which has that air which compels one to think and say Acropolis; this Acropolis dominates

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the sweep of hilly plains that have the effect of merging into infinite space—an effect confirmed by luminous dust which glorifies as well as obscures. And historically the site has much to say for itself, uttering its message with more obviousness and with less dependence upon an imagination fed by historic lore than Constantinople. For nowhere in Constantinople is there a classic ruin so striking—one cannot say complete—as that of the temple built by the provincials in honor of Cæsar Augustus; the old walls while not extensive are much more massive than those of the city of the Bosphorus. As one rides around the city-acropolis in the valley which girds it, the walls dominate the scene instead of having to be traced by a voyage of archæological exploration. There is the old column of a later Roman empire, its capital being now the abode of an enormous stork's nest—a feature of the landscape which if present plans succeed and Angora becomes in deed as well as in name the center of a rejuvenated nation will before many years be part of the familiar stock of the tourist picture post-cards.

When the eye turns from the obviously visible to the written record Angora appears anything but a remote and dilapidated Asiatic village. It contains everything of historic significance which marks any town of Asia Minor save the early science and philosophy of some of the Greek coast colonies, and perhaps it has accumulated a greater variety of significant episodes and vicissitudes in its past than any other one city. It testifies in turn to invading Gauls, Alexander the Great, St. Paul, or the author of the epistle to the Galatians, Mithridates and Pompey, Saracens and Crusaders, and the fierce Tamerlane, as well as to later

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Moslem conquerors. The time of its greatest glory was that of the Roman empire when according to archæologists it was the most elaborate and most beautiful, architecturally, of all provincial cities in Europe or Asia. Such historic reminiscences are of some present significance, for they are evidence of the central position of Angora, a meeting place for movements of men and goods between the Black Sea and Cilicia and Syria north and south, and between Persia and Constantinople east and west. This central location is given on the spot as the chief reason for making it the new capital, military safety and liberation from the dangers of foreign intrigue at Constantinople being secondary. From here it is said, "It is easy to watch over the whole of Asia Minor, to keep in touch with its needs, to respond to the requirements of the people. Constantinople is too far to one side. One ignores or forgets there the real state of the country and its necessities."

However, it is not the historic memories which make the great appeal in Angora, and which go far to induce the visitor to believe that the instincts of the new leaders are truer than the sophisticated wisdom of Constantinople. These associations blend with the bold and picturesque beauty of the place simply to reinforce the sense of the adventurous and pioneer spirit which the activities of the present create. In comparison with the efforts being put forth, Constantinople seems not old but tired; here we get the impression that man and nature have met neither in harsh hostility nor in a surrender of man to nature, but in a challenge to athletic combat. The very immensity of the task, its seeming hopelessness, have awakened new and fresh vigor. We readily

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abandon ourselves to a mood in which everything that greets the eye becomes symbolic. The carriage bumps over rocks and plows through sands on roads the like of which exist only in Asia. Then one comes upon stretches paved with well-cut and well-laid stone blocks, or solidly macadamized; one sees scores of men laboring in the gravel of the river preparing the materials for miles of modern highway which are in course of construction. Carts with solid wooden wheels swerve to let motor cars pass. Robust, well-set-up soldiers with modern equipment pass with energetic step; small boys high on donkeys with panniers on either side mix with gray-bearded, turbaned Turks sitting their donkeys with a benign gravity as if the lofty saddles were thrones.

In addition to the hundreds working on highways, there are hundreds making an extension of the railway, and other hundreds engaged in constructing new houses for this old town which has suddenly doubled its population and multiplied its importance. Between old stone walls above going back to early centuries of our era and adobe houses on a lower level, the most conspicuous buildings are two modern primary school buildings, one named for Mustapha Kemal and the other for his wife. By the side of men laboring with an activity which for the Orient is almost feverish, there are scores of men and women sitting idly in the sun, hardly sparing the energy even for gossip, gazing into immemorial vacancy with minds which appear as ancient and as vacant. Women wash their clothes by the brook, heating the water in great copper kettles which they have brought on their backs, set on hearths which they have improvised from the stones of the rivulet. Across the valley from the massive and sharply cut ascent on which

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stands the old city, lies a gently sloping hill, which we are told is the site of the future city. Representatives of an American firm are now in the town discussing with the government the terms of the contract for making this new city with modern water supply, trams, streets, public buildings, private residences. There are certain hitches, the matter is not yet decided; but sooner or later, if not by this firm, then in some way or other, a new city, the capital of a new Turkey will rise there, the emblem of a risen Turkey.

Amid this strange union of the oldest and the newest in the world, there grows the feeling of something familiar—something akin to the work of the pioneer and the frontier in America. And unbidden the conclusion is formed in the mind that however it may be with others, it is not for one whose ancestors left a civilized and formed country to go out into the wilder-

ness and build a new country to question what the present leaders of Turkey are doing. Whether the outcome is failure or success adventure, energy, determination and hope attend the undertaking. There are various kinds of old age. And if the age for which Constantinople stands is that of decay, of a world steeped in the belief that as things have been so must they ever be, it may be that those are right who say that the old age of Anatolia is one which conserves the pristine virtues of an unspoiled peasantry, as energetic in the civil arts of peace as it was vigorous and enduring in a war for independence.

At all events, I shall try to preserve that feeling which came upon me in the first hours of seeing Angora, that its selection as a capital and the will to build a new center of government far away from the memories and traditions of Constantinople is an heroic venture,

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symbolizing faith in the possibilities of the Asiatic peasant. One can hear about and read about this faith in Constantinople, one cannot get its reality there. The impression may turn out only a dream. But in a Europe where most dreams are but nightmares, I claim for myself the right to cherish this particular dream as long as it is possible to keep it alive. It is paradoxical that it should be necessary for a nation to go into Asia in order to make sure that it is to be Europeanized. But the leaders at least wish that Turkey be Europeanized in their own way and for their own benefit. And history itself is an incredible paradox, of which the mingling of old and new in Angora is but a symbol.

III

SECULARIZING A THEOCRACY

Young Turkey and the Caliphate

In Shaw's St. Joan, the French ecclesiastic prophetically lists as one item in the heroine's heresy, a something that might be called nationalism: a devotion to the state which will interfere with men's loyalty to the church. Shaw was probably thinking of western Europe and the Christian Church. But the recent history of Turkey shows that his wisdom includes also the Moslems of eastern Europe. For here too the claims of religion and of the national state have met, and patriotism has proved stronger than religious sentiment. After many centuries, the story of the separation of state and church is written to the final chapter; the world's last great theoracy—if one omits Japan for the moment—has become a laicized republic.

In the United States and in western Europe the abolition of the Caliphate, the closing of the mosque schools and the assumption of the revenues of the pious Moslem foundations aroused misgivings as well as amazement. Was not the new republic going too fast? Would not the populace, faithful to religion, be alienated from political leaders capable of such a revolutionary act? Had not the Angora government lightly thrown away its greatest resource with its domestic Mohammedan population and a large, if not chief, asset in foreign politics, by cutting itself loose from its religious connection? Upon the ground, in Constantinople, perhaps the most surprising thing is the total absence of all such misgivings and queries. The move appears a simple, natural,

inevitable thing. It presents itself as an integral and necessary step in the process of forming a national state after the western model. To question it would be to question the whole course of European history for the last three centuries. What has been effected in the rest of Europe is now taking place in the former Ottoman empire. That is all there is to the affair; if the change to a secular national state is final for the rest of Europe, it is as final for Turkey. It is a stage in one of those revolutions which do not go backward.

Indeed, it is this impression of the inevitability of the change which makes it somewhat difficult to start a discussion of the matter or get particular information. When there is no question there is no answer. The process of transforming an old mediæval empire into a modern national state modeled after the western pattern, is taking its sure if slow and tor-

turous way; there is nothing more to say. It began in the minds of educated persons years before the revolution of 1008; the granting of the Constitution was but the first outward signal of the movement. The Great War, following after the other wars, has quickened the rate of change and affected the form which it has taken; fundamentally however there is but one single and continuous evolution. If the Sultanate had not engaged in treacherous dealings with the foreign powers that occupied Constantinople, the new national state might conceivably have taken the form of a constitutional monarchy instead of a republic. If the Caliphate which remained after the Sultan was deprived of political power had not become a center of intrigues on the part of foreign powers, there might possibly have developed an innocuous connection of church and state after the model of England. But in its essence the change was destined; and the events of the War, of the period of Allied occupation and the victory over Greece only determined the particular form which it assumed.

As so often happens, the domestic view of the events which have taken place is the foreign view—only precisely reversed. Outside of Turkey and among foreigners one hears the question raised whether the possession of the Caliphate by Turkey was not a potential source of strength to Turkey in northern Africa, Arabia, India and the rest of the Moslem world; whether it was not an asset in dealing with countries like France and Great Britain that have large Moslem populations which need to be placated. But all the Turks with whom I have conversed on the matter regard the connection as a liability, not an asset. It was simply a standing invitation to foreign powers to interfere in the internal

affairs of Turkey, to use the Caliph as a cat's-paw in their rivalries with one another. Devotion to the Caliphate was doubtless not increased by the fact that Pan-Islamism and the attempt to use leadership of the Moslem world as a political asset were the work of the hated tyrant Abdul Hamid; for before his day the combined Sultan-Caliph was the chief of the Mohammedan religion only in the Pickwickian sense in which the King of England is the head of the Church of England.

Something of the same sort holds good on the internal side. The progressive Turks hold that the alliance of the church and state was the stronghold of reactionary political influence. A stranger like myself is no judge of the correctness of the statement, but the history of the rest of the world hardly renders it credible. As long as the Caliph was there the Moslem teacher-preachers—they are not prieststhroughout the country had a fictitious power, and were the natural agents of reactionary intrigues. In a secularized republic, they have only the prestige and influence which their personal character and intelligence wins for them. According to the accounts given me, the unholy alliance of church and state also encouraged foreign intrigue, as pressure or corruption at the top was disseminated throughout the provinces by means of the subordinate religious teachers. I have been told that during the time of occupation one foreign nation deliberately proposed that all primary education whatever should be placed in the hands of the ecclesiastic teachers and kept there. I have no way of verifying this story. But the fact that it is current in Turkish quarters is significant in itself. For it contains that sense of the intimate union between foreign intrigue, reactionary intellectual and moral ideas, and the Caliphate which animates the present leaders of Turkey.

Foreigners will hardly credit the tale, but, ironic as it sounds, it is a common conviction among liberal Turks that their efforts to westernize and modernize Turkey have been constantly resisted and whenever possible thwarted by the representatives of the European powers. And it is part of this common conviction that fear lest a modernized Turkey produce a Turkish nation not subject to foreign domination, has led representatives of the western powers constantly to give their support to reactionary clergy as one of the best means of keeping Turkey ignorant, backward and consequently weak. In any case, enlightened Turks believe that just as other nations in passing from mediævalism to modernity have secularized schools and laicized the state, so must Turkey. And to them that is the whole of the matter about which westerners have made so much ado.

It is said of course that this view represents only Constantinople and the views of a small group who have been in Europe either as exiles under the whole régime or as students during the early part of the new régime. There is no doubt of the strength of the influence proceeding from France and from the anti-clericalism connected therewith. In a certain sense, the whole modern political movement in Turkey strikes one as just a belated offspring of the principles of '89. But I have found only unanimity of assertion that the peasants of the interior of Asiatic Turkey have taken the expulsion of the Caliph and the closing of the mosque schools without resentment. In part this is laid to their docility, their fatalism in the presence of any fait accompli. In part, it is said to be due to the growing realization of

the futility of the instruction given in these schools; a memoriter training in reading and writing the Koran which led to nothing, save the possibility of becoming in turn a teacher of the same subjects; in part to resentment against the fact that the Caliphate was during the period of foreign occupation the tool of foreign invaders. But more generally, if also more vaguely, it is due to the fact that the succession of wars has left what remains of Turkey—for the first time in four centuries a homogeneous and compact people—with a new spirit, a spirit which has touched even remote peasants. They wish above all else a free and independent Turkey; they are nationalists to the extreme; and they are convinced that a free Turkey and a modernized Turkey are one and the same.

Of course it falls at first strangely upon the ears when one is told that Turkey is not only

not fanatic, but is not even very religious. A certain incredulity is evoked. But after a time one begins to wonder whether perhaps the contrary view so current in Christian lands is not a survival of ancient lore and legend combined with the exigencies of religious proselytism and political propaganda. One listens with growing respect to the calm statement by the rector of the rejuvenated national university: "There are two Turkeys; the real Turkey and that existing in the imagination of foreigners."

And the reading of history has a tendency to convince one that the religious persecutions and massacres with which we are so tragically familiar had their origin in that baleful fusion of race, religion and politics which is the curse of the Near East, rather than in religious fanaticism pure and simple. If such be the case, the present régime in separating the church and state and thereby acquiring the

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right to demand that other countries also sever their political policies from their religious beliefs and cults are taking the first effective step taken in 1,200 years (since these political-racial-religious feuds long antedate the arrival of the Turk in Europe) to establish the rule of tolerance and liberty. Nationalism has its evils, but its loyalties are at least less dreadful than those of dogmatic religious differences.

When then one reads a telegraphic item from Constantinople regarding some difficulty into which some foreign school, French, Italian or American, has fallen, one should supply a context. In the first place, the Turks have the very best of reasons to be suspicious of the admixture of foreign politics and foreign religions, and in the second place, they are applying to themselves the same regulations in forbiding dogmatic religious inculcations and in closing schools having a definite religious basis,

which they apply to others. Indeed, as the government recently reminded the French, in reply to a protest regarding the closing of Catholic schools which refused to abide by the rules for strictly lay education, the French were asking for privileges for their schools in Turkey which had long been forbidden by law in France itself. This does not mean that all religious instruction is forbidden. On the contrary, the curriculum of the Turkish public schools includes for the present at least two hours a week of religious instruction in the Koran—and all foreign communities are allowed to give corresponding religious instruction to their own co-religionists. But anything which smells even remotely of proselyting is rigorously forbidden. And if Turkish authorities made sensitive and sore by what seems to them persistent foreign favoritism to Greeks and Armenians at the expense of Turkish

political independence and unity, sometimes act abruptly, it is not for a hundred percent American, nor for any other nationalist, to be too quick or too loud in condemnation.

And while the Near East is the part of the world where above all others it behooves the foreigner, especially the newcomer, to listen and not have opinions and views of his own, of one thing even the transient visitor may be quite sure. Any marked change in the present régime of Turkey, other than its own natural evolution, would be a calamity from the standpoint of all those who have a philanthropic and educational interest in the country, even if they are discontented with the present situation. For it would signify an arrest of a movement which is in the direction of progress and light; it would mean a return to corruption, intrigue, ignorance, confusion, and their attendant animosities and intolerances. It would be a horrid

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thing if a too vivid memory of old histories led well-intentioned foreigners to withhold their sympathies from just those forces in Turkey which are bound to put an end to mediæval Turkey.



I

INDUSTRIAL CHINA

Nowhere in the world is the difference between industrious and industrial as great as in China. The industriousness of the Chinese is proverbial. Industrially, they are in the earliest stages of the revolution from domestic to machine production, and from transportation on the necks of men (and women and children) to the freight car. The necks of men:-for while the bulk of goods in central China is doubtless carried by its marvelous system of waterways, yet whenever winds fail the boats are towed with ropes attached to the shoulders of men-and women and children. On the Grand Canal, you can sometimes count forty persons from ten years up tugging at a rope attached to the mast of some clumsy junk.

Even a Ruskin if abruptly placed in strictly mediæval economic conditions might be forced to admit that there are two sides to the humanity of the steam locomotive. And the indiscriminate admirers of the mediæval guild might learn something from a study of the workings of its Chinese counterpart.

My last six weeks have been spent in traveling through the Province of Kiangsu. Shanghai is located in this province and it is industrially and commercially the most advanced in China, the one with the most mills, railways and foreign trade. For details and statistics the reader may go to consular reports, trade journals, etc. This article has a humbler task. Its aim is merely to record impressions which seem to me to be indicative of the problems China has to face during the years of its oncoming accelerated industrial transformation.

The fifteen towns visited are scattered from the extreme north to the extreme south of the province; strictly speaking, two of them lie in the province of Chekiang to the south. The towns fall into four groups. The first contains the treaty ports, where foreign merchants have come in, where foreign capital is concentrated, and where foreign methods, though usually subjected to Chinese conditions in the form of acceptance of the compradore as a middleman, set the pace. For technical commercial purposes, from a statistical point of view, these towns of which Shanghai is the most important, are doubtless the most interesting. From a social point of view they are the least interesting, except as one may want to make a study of the contact of two civilizations meeting with but one common object—the making of money.

Otherwise they are chiefly significant as revealing an increasing ability of the Chinese to

adopt the joint stock and managerial system without coming to grief—as did most of the early companies that were exclusively Chinese. The reasons are worth recording, because they affect the entire problem everywhere of the introduction of modern industrialism. The speculative element, the promoter element, was at first most marked. The general psychology was that of gold mine promoting. After an early furore in which most "investors" lost their money, the bitten became wary, and even legitimate enterprises could not secure attention, except in the case of a very small number of persons who had made a success of their joint-stock mills. In the next place, the Chinese family system with the obligation it puts upon the prosperous member of the family to carry all his relatives who wish to be carried made nepotism so common as to be an impossible burden. And in the third place, most of

the earlier enterprises scorned the technique of putting aside reserve funds in a prosperous season, and of writing off for depreciations. A short life and a merry one was the usual motto. Now, however, business methods have developed to the point where many Chinese mills are successfully competing with foreign capital and foreign management. In fact many Chinese think that the latter will soon be at a disadvantage because of the diversion of profits to the compradore, and the lack of personal contact with workmen. But upon this point it is not possible to get facts that can be depended upon.

The second class includes towns at the opposite extreme of development, towns that are not only non-treaty ports but that are only beginning to be touched. The northern part of the province, for example, is almost as primitive as it was five hundred years ago. The

building of a railway has created some flour mills, and since the war egg-factories have made a new market. Eggs that used to sell for a third of a cent apiece now bring three times that, and the producer gets most of the increase. In all of the towns and villages, the number of hens any one family can keep is limited by communal action, as otherwise hens would poach. The extraordinary cumulative effect of large numbers so characteristic of China is nowhere better demonstrated than in the hundred thousands of eggs that nevertheless are daily brought by hand, or rather by neck, to the factories. Such an impression may seem too slight to be recorded. But it is typical of the kind of happening that is still most significant for the larger part of industrial China. Even this fact is increasing the value of land, raising the standard of living so that rural families

that had only one bedding now have two, and is changing the attitude toward railways from one of hostility to one of favor.

In these primitive districts one realizes also the immense odds that have to be overcome. There are districts of a million population that a few years ago had no public schools whatever, no public press, no postoffices, and where these facilities are still most scanty. The great positive obstacle is the activity of bandits. Being a robber is a recognized profession like being a merchant. The well-to-do live in constant fear of being looted so that their homes are almost as bare as those of beggars and in fear of being kidnapped for ransom. The professions of soldier and bandit are interchangeable, and upon the whole the peasants prefer the latter. One hears the story of the traveler who met a whole village in flight with their household goods on mules and in wheelbarrows, because the soldiers were coming to protect them from bandits.

It is such facts as these that lead many to assert that any genuine industrial development of China must wait upon the formation of a strong and stabilized government. The significance of the political factor is evidenced in the province of Anhwei which juts into the northern part of Kiangsu. Here is seen the perfect flower of militarism. The military governor recently closed all schools in the province for a year in order to spend the money on his army. He has been getting personal possession of all the mines in the province and recently diverted a river from two cities in order to make a canal to some of his mines. This is only an extreme case of the effect of present political conditions upon the industrial growth of China. Almost everywhere officials

use their power, based on control of soldiers, to exact tribute. They levy blackmail on mills and mines; use the control of railways to manipulate the supply of cars until they can force an interest to be given them. Then they reinvest their funds in pawn shops, banks and other agencies of economic domination. Thus a new kind of feudalism is growing up in which militarism is a direct adjunct to capitalism. These men keep their spare millions in foreign banks and have places of refuge in foreign concessions. The control of the Ministries of Communications and of Finance is equivalent to an economic overlordship of China, and the effects ramify everywhere. The station master has to pay several thousands of dollars to get his job, and he recoups by charging fifty or a hundred dollars when a shipper wants a car. Yet industry and commerce are advancing, and there is probably as much reason for thinking that in the end their growth will reform government as that a stabilized government will permit the normal growth of industry.

The third class of towns consists of cities that also represent old China, but the prosperous and cultivated side of old China, cities that are now lazy, luxurious and refined along with extreme poverty and ignorance; towns that are slowly degenerating, for they encourage none of the new methods while at the same time the new methods are diverting industry and trade from them. To these cities go many retired officials with their stolen funds. As one moves about near the clubhouses and gilded house boats one hears everywhere the click of the gambling dominoes. There is money for dissipation and opium, but little for new industrial developments. Surplus funds are invested in neighboring rice lands; old small owners are crowded out, and a large class of tenant farm-

ers is being created where family ownership has been the rule. Where the northern towns are merely primitive and backward, these once rich cities of the southern part of the province are reactionary and corrupt.

Finally there are industrial towns where foreigners cannot own land, or trade and where the chimneys of cotton and flour mills, and silk filatures are as numerous and smoky as in the factory districts of Shanghai—a development mostly of the last ten years, and indeed largely post-war. As it happens, the two most important of these towns present opposite types. In one of them the entire development has been in the hands of a single family, two brothers. And the leading spirit is one of a small group of men who vainly and heroically strove for the reformation of the Manchu dynasty from Finding his plans pigeon-holed and his efforts blocked, he retired to his native town

and began almost single-handed a course of industrial and economic development. He has in his record the fact that he established the first strictly Chinese cotton mill in China and also the first normal school. And since both were innovations, since China had never had either of these things, he met with little but opposition and prophecies of disaster to himself and the district. Now the district is known popularly as the model town of China, with its good roads, its motor buses for connecting various villages, its technical schools, its care of blind and deaf, its total absence of beggars. But the method is that of old China at its best, a kind of Confucian paternalism; an exhibition on the small scale of the schemes for the reformation of the country which were rejected on the large scale. The combination of the new in industry and the old in ideas is signalized in the girl and woman labor in the

factories, while the magnate finds it "inconvenient" that boys and girls should be educated together after the age of ten years, with the usual result that most of the girls receive no schooling. The other town represents a go-asyou-please competitive development. There is less symmetry but more vitality. Many deplore the absence of coöperation and organization in developing civic life. But it is characteristic of young China that it regards the greater individualism with all its lack of system as more promising than what it terms the benevolent autocracy of the model town.

But all of the industrial towns have one problem in common, and it is the problem of China. Is the industrial development of China to repeat the history of Great Britain, the United States and Japan until the evils of total laissez faire bring about a labor movement and

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a class struggle? 1 Or will the experience of other countries be utilized and will the development be humanized? China is the land of problems, of problems so deadlocked and interlocked that one is constantly reminded of the Chinese puzzles of his childhood days. But for China and for the whole world this problem of the direction to be taken by its industrial evolution is the one of chief importance. Outwardly all the signs as yet point to movement in the inhuman direction, to blind repetition of the worst stages of the western industrial revolution. There are no factory laws, and if there were, no government capable of administering and enforcing them. You find silk filatures in which children of eight and ten are working fourteen hours a day for a pittance, and twelve hours is the regular shift in all the

¹ The nationalistic revolution which has occurred since this was written has brought with it a development of labor unions, and also at times a class-war. [Added in republication.]

mills. And these establishments have many of them for the last few years paid dividends of from fifty to two hundred and fifty percent a year. Superficially China looks at the outset of its industrial career like the paradise of the socially unrestrained exploiter. The case however is not so simple or so certain. It is still conceivable that the future historian will say that the resistance of China to the introduction of the agencies of modern production and distribution, the resistance which was long cited as the classic instance of stupid conservatism, was in truth the manifestation of a mighty social instinct which led China to wait until the world had reached a point where it was possible for society to control the industrial revolution instead of being its slave. But the tail of an article is no place even to list the conditions and forces which make such a history conceivable, and only conceivable at the best.

II

IS CHINA A NATION?

SIR:—No doubt—many, like myself, follow your interesting series of articles and editorials on China with a painful ignorance of how much of a nation China is. China is continually referred to as if she were as compact and homogeneous a social and political entity as Switzerland. We know she has several hundred millions. How many of them are conscious? I suppose my vague mental image of China as a country practically without a bourgeoisie, with a very small literate class, a farmer class practically on the proletarian level, and an enormous hinterland of stolid barbarians, practically immune to propaganda or to any but the most primitive forms of racial emotion, is common among those who studied geography before the Treaty of Portsmouth.

Does what is referred to politically, or what

expresses itself audibly, as China, represent a few hundred thousands of the educated and the wealthy in the coast cities, or a few millions, or a substantial and dominating minority of the whole population?

For those who ask this question it is not an idle one. China is the stock example of survival by submission. If she is a nation in the European—(or Balkan)—sense, it is obvious that Japan cannot sit on her chest forever. If not, the nation that organizes her industries and her education may be able to swallow her, for political and economic purposes, more completely than England swallowed India (and India, though not digested, may be considered swallowed). Or the old inertia of size and patience may prevail, and the Japanese be swallowed—and digested—like their predecessors.

If there is a book that gives the data on these questions, would you be kind enough to recommend it to me? And meanwhile would it not be worth while to get Professor Dewey, who is so admirably equipped by temperament and

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interest, as well as by his recent visit, to cover briefly, in an article or two, these phenomena?

J. W. Helburn.

Geneva, Switzerland.

An answer could easily be given to the questions in Mr. Helburn's letter which would be literally correct, and yet almost wholly misleading. China certainly is not a nation as we know nations in Europe. It is sprawling, not compact. It is as diversified as Europe, if not more so, instead of being homogeneous like Switzerland or France. Everyone has heard of students from the north and south who talk to one another in English so as to be understood. But there are populous parts of China where a native has to go only a few miles to fail to understand the language of his compatriots. As for political self-consciousness, let the following true story serve. Students went from Shanghai to a neighboring village at the begin-

ning of the anti-Japanese agitation a year and a half ago. The villagers listened patiently to their impassioned pleas for an interest in the policies of Peking dominated by "traitors," and for a patriotic boycott of Japan. Then they said in effect: "This is very well for you. You are Chinese. But we are Jonesvillians. These things are not our business." And this was not in the hinterland but close to the most developed coast city.

Yet if any would argue alone or chiefly to the future from such facts, he would certainly go wrong. Not because they are not massively representative, but because things are in flux. It is not safe to prophesy where they are going. But they are going somewhere, so that a Chinese politician who goes steadily contrary to the interests of China as a nation is sure to be overthrown sooner or later. Even a Chinese within China cannot safely base his actions upon the state of things which is correctly represented above. Yet it would be equally unsafe to argue to the existence of a persistently influential minority from the fact of the thousands of telegrams sent to Paris in protest against signing a treaty that had within it the Shantung clause, or from the fact that a cabinet dominated by pro-Japanese politicians, and in control of finance and the army, simply did not dare enter into direct negotiations with Japan about Shantung. In a crisis there may be a minority so substantial as to be dominating. But only in a crisis.

Is China a nation? No, not as we estimate nations. But is China becoming a nation, and how long will it take? These are the open questions. Anyone who could answer them definitely could read the future of the Far East like a book. But no one can answer them definitely. In this suspense and uncertainty

lies the momentous interest of the situation. When did nations begin to be, anyway? How long has France been a compact and homogeneous nation? Italy, Germany? What forces made them nations? And what is going to be the future of the national state outside of China? What is the future of internationalism? Our whole concept of a nation is of such recent origin that it is not surprising that it does not fit in any exact way into Chinese conditions. And possibly the days in which political nationality is most fully established are also the days of its beginning to decline. The last suggestion may be wild. But it suggests that the world as well as China is in flux, and that answers to the questions whether and when China is to be a nation, and what kind of a nation it is to be, cannot be found till we know also what is going to happen in Russia, and Europe generally.

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At present, to continue the negative side of the affair, there is little public spirit in China. Family and locality spirit give China its strength for its old traditional ends and its weakness for contemporary conditions and for international relations. Even among the politicians factional spirit is much stronger than public or national spirit—and this is a weakness alike for traditional and new objects. A big army eats up public revenues and makes China increasingly dependent upon foreign loans and subject to foreign spirit interference. It is of no use for national aggression and of next to none for national defense. It is of use for graft, for personal ambitions and factional strife. China has all the disadvantages of both extreme centralization and extreme States' rights, and few of the advantages of either. There is not only a division between north and south, but a cross division in both the north and

south, and in addition a multitude of cross currents of provincial isolations and ambitions.

And yet was the United States a nation in the critical years after 1783? Was there not a bitter civil war only sixty years ago, and did not Gladstone announce that Jefferson Davis had created a new nation? Are all questions of national unity and States' rights yet settled? Not many centuries ago European politicians took funds from foreign governments to strengthen the hands of their own factions, and upon occasion foreign interference was invited or welcomed for furtherance of party or religious strife. Hardly today are the respective claims of state and church fully adjusted, while up till recently a church located outside the nation claimed and secured powers of intervention. And this at least is a complication which China is spared.

I have recently read the words of an intelli-

gent English visitor in America to the effect that the diversity of unfused populations and traditions is such that the United States is one country only in the sense in which the continent of Europe is one. And at about the same time H. G. Wells, using a different criterion, that of freedom and ease of movement and transportation, was saying that the United States was such a complete empire within itself that we could not speak of it and of France as nations in the same sense of the word nation. Such a miscellaneous citation warns us that we cannot use the conception of nation in any but a fluid sense, even in western affairs. They indicate the difficulty in making hard and fast statements about Chinese national unity.

When we turn from political to economic affairs, our habitual western ideas are even less applicable. Their irrelevancy makes it impossible intelligently to describe Chinese condi-

tions, or even grasp them intelligently. In the familiar sense of the word, there is no bourgeoisie in China. There used to be a gentry with considerable unwritten power, but for the time being at least it is practically non-existent. The merchant class is traditionally outside of political concerns, and has not as yet developed any political or social class consciousness, though some signs of its beginnings were evidenced in connection with the boycott of 1919. Even in the west one has considerable difficulty in placing the farmers in the bourgeoisieproletariat terminology (one is tempted to say patter). And how is a class of peasant proprietors who form not merely the vast mass of a people but its economic and moral backbone, who are traditionally and in present esteem, the respectable part of the population, next to the scholars, to be classified under our western notions?

Even in the west the point of these distinctions is the product of the industrial revolution. And in China the industrial revolution has still to occur. China is a much better place to study European history of a few centuries ago than to apply the concepts and classifications of present political and economic science. The visitor spends his time learning, if he learns anything about China, not to think of what he sees in terms of the ideas he uses as a matter of course at home. The result is naturally obscurity rather than light. But it may be questioned whether the most enlightening thing he can do for others who are interested in China is not to share with them his discovery that China can be known only in terms of itself, and older European history. Yet one must repeat that China is changing rapidly; and that it is as foolish to go on thinking of it in terms of old dynastic China—as Mr. Bland for example

insists we must do—as it is to interpret it by pigeon-holing its facts in western conceptions. China is another world politically and economically speaking, a large and persistent world, and a world bound no one knows just where. It is the combination of these facts that give it its overpowering intellectual interest for an observer of the affairs of humanity.

The question of China's nationhood, as the writer of the letter of inquiry goes on to observe, "is not an idle one. China is the stock example of survival by submission. If she is a nation in the European or Balkan sense, it is obvious that Japan cannot sit upon her chest forever. If not, the nation that organizes her industries and education may be able to swallow her, for political and economic purposes, more completely than England swallowed India—swallowed, if not digested. Or the old inertia of size and patience may prevail, and

the Japanese be swallowed and digested like their predecessors."

These remarks are pertinent, and they enter into the constant query of the foreign observer in China. And yet he can hardly go further than noting the problem, noting the flux of events, and some of the factors that may turn its direction. It is not safe, for one thing, to argue that because China has absorbed all previous invaders that she will end by incorporating into herself future intruders. Her previous conquerors were northern barbarians upon a lower plane of civilization. What would have happened if they had brought with them a superior technique of industry and administration no one knows. Marquis Okuma is reported to have accounted for China's long story of independent existence on the ground that she had no railways. At first sight this may seem to resemble the child's statement that pins save

persons' lives, because persons don't swallow them. But it suggests the radically different character of ancient and modern invasions. The latter center about exploitation of previously unused economic resources. A country that had possession of China's ports, railways, mines and communications would have China in subjection. The wiser the invading country, the less would she assume the burdens of civil administration beyond necessary policing. She would act as permanent exploiting capitalist using the natural resources and unskilled labor of the country to serve her own ends. In addition she would doubtless try to conscript native man-power for her armies. Generally speaking, the natives would act as coolies, the foreigners as upper-class personages. Under such conditions, success or non-success in cultural assimilation would amount to little.

But as soon as such things are said, the mind

at once recalls that improvement of internal communication and transportation has been a chief factor in developing countries into political units, while oppression from without has been the other great factor. The same forces are operating in China and will continue to operate. Nationalistic feeling as it now exists is largely the product of reaction against foreign encroachments. It is strongest on the seaboard not merely because industrial development is most advanced there, but because the aggressions of foreigners have been most felt at that point. Effort to take advantage of absence of national unity to subject a country is likely to end in creating a national consciousness. Korea is a striking example. Politically corrupt and divided, with no national political consciousness, less than a generation of alien rule combined with industrial and educational changes designed wholly to subserve the inter-

ests of the foreign power, have almost converted Korea into a second Ireland. History seems to show that nations are hardened into being under influences intended to subvert nationality. China is not likely to be an exception. While it is not a nation "in being," events are probably evoking a nation in becoming. And the process is hastened by efforts to prevent it. At the same time no report is honest which does not state that almost any faction in any part of China, north or south, will surrender national rights to a foreign country in return for factional aid against its internal foes.

One other factor in probable evolution should be mentioned. For a long time, the great Powers, with the exception of the United States, proceeded upon the assumption that China was bound to be disintegrated, and that the policy of each foreign nation was to get its fair share of the spoils. This statement may be too strong. But at least the working assumption was that whenever any disintegration occurred, surrender to one nation must be compensated for, at China's expense, by concessions to others. The World War made conditions such that other nations could not compete with Japan in this game. It is fairly clear now that the disintegration of China would be almost exclusively to Japan's advantage. Hence a great access of benevolent interest on the part of other Powers in China's national integrity. China's historic foreign policy has been to play one Power off against another. Now she is aided by a tendency of all the Powers to give her at least passive assistance against Japanese encroachments. The formation of the consortium with its abolition of distinctive spheres of foreign influence, the question of the re-affirmation or abrogation of

the British-Japanese Alliance, the Shantung affair, acquire their meaning in this context. The as yet unsolved question is what Japan can by promise or threat offer by way of compensation to other great Powers to induce them to give her a freer hand in China.

An American educator long resident in central China remarked to me that China was trying to crowd into a half century literary, religious, economic, scientific and political revolutions which it had taken the western world centuries to accomplish. The remark indicates the difficulty in making predictions and in offering definite descriptions. In spite of the inertia and stability that still dominate the vast rural districts, in spite of non-fulfillment of specific past prophecies of changing China. China is in a state of flux. The accumulated effect of thousands of petty changes due to contact with western methods and ideas, has

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been to create a new mind in the educated class. This fact is at present more important than any single big external change or external failure to change that can be singled out. It will take a long time for this new mind to work itself out in definite achievement or even to trace definitely perceptible lines of progress. But these conditions which make intelligent description so difficult are those which lend China its absorbing interest.



The

RUSSIAN LAND

by ALBERT RHYS WILLIAMS

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